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Saskatchewan 2024:
Making Change Happen
Introduction and
Executive Summary
This panel was constituted by the Provincial
Council of the Saskatchewan NDP
following the October 2020 provincial
election. The panel’s mandate and tasks
were defined by the following resolution:
“That the Saskatchewan NDP will conduct an
external, comprehensive review of the 2020
provincial election outcome with a dual focus on
both the root causes of the result, and solutionbased recommendations to prepare for the next
election. The review will be inclusive of
stakeholders and will review structure, processes
and election preparation.
“The report will assess strengths and weaknesses
and provide actionable recommendations for the
coming four years of building toward the next
campaign. The review will inform a strategic plan
for the future and will be reviewed operationally
on a regular basis by executive and council. The
results of the review will be provided to the
Provincial Council before the next Provincial
Convention. The review panel will be led by
Gerry Scott, with four additional members to be
elected by Provincial Council.”

government. We also very explicitly sought
advice from everyone we met with on the
changes and improvements that they felt
were needed to bring electoral success.
We began our work in December and in
January and February we interviewed and
met with people throughout the province,
including MLAs, former MLAs and
ministers, 2020 candidates, trade union
representatives, constituency associations,
representatives of the party wings and
committees, campaign staff, and other
activists from a variety of backgrounds.
We conducted 45 interviews with
individuals, 16 regional constituency
meetings with 61 constituencies represented,
five meetings with trade unions and the SFL,
and seven sessions with internal party bodies
such as the wings. Through two mass
emails we also sought input from all
members, volunteers and donors that were in
the party’s central database. We received
and reviewed 320 individual and
constituency written submissions.

In addition to Gerry Scott (chair), four panel
members were elected by the Council: Judy
Bradley, Modeste McKenzie, Craig Scott
and Brian Topp (brief biographical notes on
the panelists are at the end of the report).

We thank all of the members and
organizations who made submissions and
particularly those who met with us. We also
want to thank Samira Wagner who provided
valuable staff support to the panel
throughout this process.

In laying out our work plan, we paid special
heed to Provincial Council’s focus on “root
causes” and the need for “solution-based
recommendations.” Accordingly, we took
the perspective that, while assessing the
2020 campaign was important, equally
important was the task of examining trends
that arose in the years since we were last in

We have heard a wide range of opinions
about the past and the future, and we have
attempted to assess all of the information in
a balanced way to bring forward both the
most common themes and the ideas for
change that we feel have the most potential
to support victory in 2024.
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The panel heard from many about how
much Saskatchewan has changed in the past
couple of decades. Fewer and much larger
farms; more urbanization; more polarization
on social and political issues including
Indigenous relations; Saskatchewan’s
increased economic reliance on oil and gas;
the rise of right-wing populism; fundamental
changes to the media; the evolution of a
basic two-party system; and a precipitous
drop in voter turnout.
It is important to note that, while most of our
discussions focused on the challenges of
recent years and the need for change going
forward, we also heard a lot of praise. Many
members felt they had seen a well-run,
professional campaign; a strong Leader’s
debate performance; a strong Leader’s tour;
a truly diverse slate of candidates; increased
supports for local campaigns; successful
fundraising; and excitement and pride in a
renewed caucus of thirteen energetic MLAs,
including eight female MLAs, three
Indigenous MLAs and a re-elected Leader
(the first since 2007). Generally speaking,
the campaign itself was not seen by most as
the biggest challenge, although areas that
need improvement were certainly identified.
But that does not mean these results were in
any way acceptable to the members of the
Saskatchewan NDP with whom we spoke.
We were solidly defeated for the fourth time
in a row. Members feel strongly that a lot
about our party must change.
But most participants felt that the most
important challenges that the Saskatchewan
NDP faces go far beyond what was done or
not done in the most recent 28-day
campaign period.

Many submissions highlighted the
challenges we have specifically faced in
recent elections in rural constituencies.
Members feel that strong action is required
to address those challenges – beginning with
a strong response to the attacks on the
records of the Romanow and Calvert
governments.
Many also noted that there are too many
working families either not voting or
supporting the Saskatchewan Party (SP)
conservatives because, in their view, we
have not connected strongly enough on jobs,
working people’s experiences, their fears of
income insecurity, and pocketbook issues
generally.
Many stressed the declining voter turnout in
recent elections and challenged us to address
the need to reach non-voters, including the
many Indigenous people who relate more
strongly to federal politics.
Importantly, many activists also told us that
internal reforms are needed to connect
members and supporters more effectively
with the central party and caucus, to ensure
two-way communications are strengthened,
and to engage our supporters in more active
ways year-round and not just at election
time.
Since the 2007 election when we lost power,
the Saskatchewan NDP has suffered from
internal turnover, disappointments of losses,
decline of our rural base, leaders losing their
own seats, and conflicts on issues such as
climate and energy. Despite diminishing
public enthusiasm for the SP conservatives,
they have been left in office as a result of
these factors and our failure to fully
capitalize on their failings.
At the same time, the SP has abused their
position in order to brand their party,
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Saskatchewan’s provincial government, and
this province as essentially one and the
same. They have also deployed vastly
superior financial resources for year-round
campaigning.

The Saskatchewan NDP is the party that
built a fiscally sound, prosperous and
environmentally responsible Saskatchewan but we must also remind and persuade
voters of that fact.

We want to again stress that our present
situation did not arise just since the last
election cycle of 2016-2020. Most of the
factors that we describe in this report have
been developing over the past 15 to 20
years.

It is the party that has the vision and the
competence in government to steer
Saskatchewan toward where (to paraphrase
a great Canadian) the puck is going to be,
not where it is now.
Our major recommendations in brief:

We must grapple with major, longer-term
issues. Getting them right is vital if the NDP
is to rebuild and become truly competitive to
win the 2024 election.

First, we need to change the way we do
our political work.

The NDP way is to get the job done. When
in government, the NDP has, time and again,
got down to work, whether it was erecting
the stable foundations of Saskatchewan’s
social, economic and physical infrastructure
from Tommy Douglas through Allan
Blakeney or whether it was the Romanow
and Calvert governments picking up after
the rampant criminal corruption and
economic incompetence of the Grant Devine
Conservatives - the parents of today’s SP
conservatives.

Our caucus and party must aggressively
prosecute the record, competence, ethics
and priorities of the current government.
If we don’t have a problem with the
government, the public won’t either.

It is again our challenge to persuade the
people of Saskatchewan to give us the
chance to prove our competence in leading
transformation of the economy. The burden
is indeed on us. It is for the NDP to set out
the plans and inspire the trust of the people
of Saskatchewan, to show them that not only
did we get the job done successfully in the
past, but we will get the job done again. We
need to stimulate the drive and skills of
Saskatchewan’s people to tackle the
challenges we face, not just as they appear at
present but also as they will take shape in
the future.

We must conduct four-year, 365-days-ayear campaigns, as elections are not
usually won or lost in the official 28-day
campaign period.

The Saskatchewan NDP must
aggressively challenge our opponent’s lies
and distortions about our record in office.
In the eyes of too many former supporters,
we are currently disqualified from office
because we have unwisely chosen not to
answer those attacks.
We need to speak directly to the principal
concerns of working families in the
province – their jobs, their economic
security, and their future in a resourcedriven economy that is facing changes
driven by global forces.
And the Saskatchewan NDP needs to reassume its role as this province’s
strongest and most effective national
advocates, after a long period of the
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province punching far below its weight in
the federation under “Saskatchewan Party”
premiers rightly viewed as lightweights by
their peers on the national stage. When
necessary, that includes fearlessly standing
up to the federal NDP when it is wrong on
Saskatchewan’s provincial issues.
Second, our party itself needs to change
and improve, on a number of fronts.

Few political parties have a deeper talent
pool than the Saskatchewan NDP – but
much of it has been sitting on the bench. It is
homecoming time for all members and
supporters of the Saskatchewan NDP, from
every generation.
Few parties have prouder records. It’s time
to be proud, and to say so – while speaking
to today’s issues with, and for, a new
generation of people with new ideas.

Among them:
•

Active outreach to build relationships
with Indigenous Peoples and diverse
communities throughout the province.

•

How the party and its campaigns are
governed.

•

The candidate nomination process.

•

The platform and policy process.

•

Our network of constituency
associations, especially in rural
communities.

•

Fundraising and expansion of other
party-building capacities

•

Internal and external
communications.

And few parties in opposition face such an
unsuccessful, fiscally irresponsible, corrupt,
and poorly led opponent – an opponent with
such a troubling past they changed their
name to hide it. It’s time to hold them
accountable, 365 days a year.
People all across Saskatchewan – urban and
rural, young and old, Indigenous peoples
and newer Canadians – know that the time is
coming to end the drift, dithering and
failures of this province’s current
government.
It’s time for a change in Saskatchewan.
But before the people of Saskatchewan will
trust us to change this province, they need to
see us change. Change what we present to
them; and change how we operate as a party.
That is what this report is about.
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Part 1: Results
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(1) Eligible voter turnout in Saskatchewan elections
has declined.
Participation in Saskatchewan elections, traditionally high, dropped abruptly in
1995 and has remained low since. Conservatives generally do better in low turnout
elections.
Election
1982
1986
1991
1995
1999
2003
2007
2011
2016
2020

Turnout
79.8%
76.8%
77.4%
57.4%
55.9%
58.3%
60.8%
51.1%
53.5%
52.8%
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(2) The NDP is struggling to rebuild its caucus.
The NDP’s rise and fall since 1982 involved sweeping city and suburban seats
(1986) and then rural ones (1991) – and then surrendering these gains in reverse
order. The NDP has a strong and resilient provincial core vote but has not been
able to grow beyond it for four cycles.
Election

NDP vote

Caucus

Outcome

1982
1986

37.6%
44.6%

9
25

Opposition (Blakeney)
Opposition (Blakeney)

1991
1995
1999
2003

51.0%
47.2%
38.7%
44.6%

55
42
29
30

Majority (Romanow)
Majority (Romanow)
Minority (Romanow)
Majority (Calvert)

2007
2011
2016
2020

37.2%
32.0%
30.4%
31.6%

20
9
10
13

Opposition (Calvert)
Opposition (Lingenfelter)
Opposition (Broten)
Opposition (Meili)
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(3) A regional breakdown tells a more complex story.
The Party’s northern vote is quite resilient - but not to be taken for granted.
Our urban and suburban vote has been steadily recovering since 2011 and is in
sight of the numbers earned during winning campaigns, although the suburban gap
remains a challenge.
Our rural vote held respectably throughout our last term in government (20032007), but rural communities are now where conservatives are piling up their
largest pluralities (the riding-by-riding details of this chart are set out in Appendix
B).

1978

1982

1986

1991

1995

1999

2003

2007

2011

2016

2020

North

58.7%

51.8%

58.0%

82.3%

57.3%

76.7%

69.8%

62.7%

63.5%

63.5%

61.7%

Four cities
Urban.core
Suburbs

53.7%
54.0%
50.3%

40.7%
41.5%
35.0%

55.7%
57.3%
43.4%

58.4%
61.0%
44.7%

56.1%
59.9%
39.6%

47.1%
50.4%
32.4%

52.5%
57.3%
34.7%

45.0%
50.1%
26.2%

39.4%
44.4%
21.2%

40.7%
46.3%
29.0%

44.6%
49.8%
33.7%

Northwest
Northeast
Southwest
Southeast

43.6%
52.1%
35.7%
40.8%

31.9%
41.8%
29.1%
34.2%

37.6%
44.0%
30.9%
36.2%

42.7%
50.1%
32.5%
44.5%

40.6%
42.7%
27.9%
38.8%

38.8%
35.3%
19.4%
27.3%

37.8%
38.9%
23.3%
35.9%

31.8%
31.0%
16.0%
26.2%

26.5%
25.1%
12.2%
21.8%

18.9%
22.8%
15.3%
17.5%

16.6%
21.1%
15.4%
17.4%
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(4) Conservatives enjoy a massive fundraising
advantage during and between elections, fueled by
corporate donations.
The former Devine Conservatives retook power in 2007 powered by over $3
million in corporate donations - over 60% of the funds they raised that year - and
have been generously funded by corporate supporters in Calgary and in-province
every year since.
The official financial numbers displayed in the chart below, published by Elections
Saskatchewan, likely significantly understate the funds available for recent
conservative campaigns, given the growing role of rightwing dark money and
third-party entities.
The NDP has benefited from corporate and trade union donations, especially
during election years, but is in no way financially competitive against its SP
conservative opponent under current fundraising rules. Since 2007, the SP has
raised over $27 million more than the NDP.
NDP

SP

SP Advantage

2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019

1,715,234
2,289,818
941,494
1,171,000
1,342,431
2,096,988
956,597
1,177,515
408,542
1,326,180
2,398,419
1,321,915
1,320,315
1,354,521

1,406,475
4,794,646
1,364,442
1,697,903
3,932,775
6,113,499
3,267,950
2,680,215
2,731,762
4,264,353
5,740,052
2,937,599
2,714,418
3,405,067

-308,759
2,504,828
422,949
526,803
2,590,344
4,016,511
2,311,353
1,502,700
2,323,220
2,938,172
3,341,633
1,615,684
1,394,103
2,050,546

Total

19,821,069

47,051,155

27,230,086

(It should also be noted that political fundraising reports in Saskatchewan hide as much as they reveal.
For example, reports blend corporate donations with campaign loans. The vulnerability to out-ofprovince funders; the dominance of out-of-province corporate donations to the governing party; and poor
reporting and accountability were corrected long ago in other provinces)
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(5) Party membership has steadily declined since its
peak in 1991.
The historical membership numbers below are not complete, but there is no
question that numbers in recent years are far below the party’s peak membership.
Membership
1991
2003
2007
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019

45,000
16,600
8,600
13,200
10,200
9,000
8,200
11,000
7,600
6,400
5,300
7,600
14,100
8,000

Note
Peak membership
Provincial election year
Provincial election year
Leadership race
Provincial election year
Leadership race
Provincial election year
Leadership race
Provincial election year
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Part 2: Why These results?
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(1) The so-called
“Saskatchewan” Party
proved to be a loyal
pupil of the NDP.
The current government was launched as a
tactical merger of the Progressive Conservative
and a portion of the Liberal caucuses in the
Legislature - creating a vehicle to pool
Conservative and Liberal votes, the traditional
means to unseat the NDP in Saskatchewan.
This new entity then set out to “out NDP the
NDP”. They aimed to disqualify the NDP in the
eyes of voters in the same manner the NDP had
succeeded in disqualifying the Conservatives of
Grant Devine – and deployed a massive
fundraising advantage to do so.
This continuation of the Devine regime in
another guise has been as successful as it is
brazen.
It has appropriated the province’s name and
provincial colours, in the same way that
Quebec’s Parti Québécois and other ethnic
nationalist and rightwing parties have done
around the democratic world – an attempt to
signal that true citizens of this province must
support the conservative record and policy.
It created a false-front vehicle, the
“Saskatchewan Party'', to allow senior figures
from the Devine Conservative government to
return to provincial politics without being held
accountable for their conduct in office. That
included Brad Wall (in his early public career a
talented rightwing populist before his real face
eventually emerged).

when they merged with a portion of the Liberal
caucus. For example, the government recently
implemented an insurance rebate suggested by
the NDP caucus.
But, unfortunately, a $2-billion-and-counting
public tendering scandal and a public debt
heading to $30 billion demonstrate that the
current government learned neither to keep their
fingers out of the public cookie jar nor how to
count.
The police investigations and prosecutions that
flowed from the last conservative round in office
ruined many lives and careers. Some figures
committed serious crimes. Others were
prosecuted for trivial violations (for example,
one elderly Conservative MLA ended his career
with a tearful apology to his grandchildren in the
legislature, after being caught using his MLA
allowances to buy a saddle for rodeo parades in
his constituency).
The conservatives’ recovery from this utter
discredit and ruin; their careful study of what
made the Saskatchewan NDP successful; their
ability to learn and adapt; and their
determination to win - all this has generated a
remarkable if improbable political chapter in
Saskatchewan’s colourful history. The Devine
Conservatives figured out how to return to
office.
To turn the page on that chapter, the
Saskatchewan NDP needs to find the same
energy and determination within itself.

And it elected a government that learned a few
things. Returned to office, the conservatives
have been stealthier and more incremental. For
example, they have been hollowing-out and
contracting-out the province’s Crown
Corporations, instead of trying to sell them. And
they have regularly made symbolic gestures to
hold the traditionally Liberal vote they acquired
Page | 14

(2) Our approach to
opposition has not
disqualified this
government.
The NDP, some argue, has been an overly
“nice” opposition. In the view of many party
activists who spoke to us, in recent election
cycles the NDP has chosen a relatively polite
and unduly ‘reasonable’ approach to both the
conservative government’s glaring scandals and
its policy failures. “The NDP is playing nice and
gentlemanly and being kind,” a former candidate
told us. “The rules of politics are otherwise.”
If we do not have a problem with the
government, why should the public?
It bears saying that this may be too simple.
The NDP under Dwain Lingenfelter mounted a
ferociously negative campaign aimed at
profiling Brad Wall’s troubling history as a
senior official in the Devine government. Mr.
Lingenfelter was himself then politically
disqualified for being “too negative”.
Cam Broten energetically profiled the SP’s
corruption in office, including the Wall
government’s still-to-be-investigated multi-

billion scandals and gross fiscal mismanagement
during a commodities boom. Mr. Broten too was
disqualified for being “too negative”, notably
during the 2016 leader’s debate.
As we can see from the CBC Saskatchewan poll
tracker set out above, the Saskatchewan NDP
caucus mounted a relatively effective opposition
between 2016 and 2018, exploiting serious
mistakes by the conservatives.
The caucus avoided tangling with the stillpopular Premier Wall and instead focused on
vulnerable ministers, whose many weaknesses,
suitably profiled, were beginning to persuade the
public to reconsider the wisdom of rehiring them
to run the province – and were also beginning to
persuade voters to question the premier’s
judgement.
The caucus emphasized the need for a better and
more effective focus on jobs and the economy.
They profiled the government’s record of
“mismanagement, scandal and waste” –
repeating that line until the public was beginning
to hear it. And they responded effectively to a
grossly unpopular budget.
Caucus members told us they could see they
were connecting with the public during this
period. Their arguments started to be repeated
back to them by citizens at increasingly wellattended urban and rural public meetings. Mr.
Page | 15

Wall’s “reveal your real face” final budget
confirmed much of what the Saskatchewan NDP
was saying.

for voters by 2020. They needed to be, for the
NDP to have a shot at winning the election. That
is still true today.

And then the “Saskatchewan Party” switched to
a new leader, softened some of its unpopular
budget provisions and - as if coated in Teflon successfully turned the page. The NDP gains
were reversed.

The departures from cabinet of Bill Boyd and
Joe Hargrave, driven out by public anger
over their lapses, are proof that determined
NDP opposition tactics can pierce the SP
armour. Governments can be, and are, defeated
by their mistakes, their misguided priorities,
their neglect of people’s needs - if the opposition
skillfully and relentlessly attacks and exposes
those misdeeds in ways that connect with the
public. Simultaneously, we must draw a sharp
contrast by effectively communicating our offer
to Saskatchewan voters. Those are the key tasks
ahead.

Therefore, a glaringly weak, tired and
incompetent Saskatchewan Party ministerial
team; the need for a forward plan for jobs and
the economy instead of running up the
province’s credit card during a commodities
boom; conservative mismanagement, scandal
and waste; and Scott Moe’s troubling issues of
character and competence were not top of mind
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(3) The NDP decided not
to respond to the
conservative framing of
its record.
In April 2021, NDP MLA Aleana Young
engaged in a memorable exchange with
Jeremy Harrison, who is (as she likes to say)
the worst economic development minister in
Canada -- a typical minister of the current SP
government. Young pointed out that the SP
government’s obsessive attacks on health
policy implemented thirty years ago is an
attempt to deflect from their own record –
and is aimed at an NDP team who were
schoolchildren at the time.
Some of our caucus then posted photos of
themselves so that voters in Saskatchewan could
see who the government was attacking. Here

they are above. Points for correctly identifying
everyone.
A couple of observations on this:
First, the NDP caucus is the future. They are a
team of bright, energetic, and highly capable
MLAs. They are broad cross section of people
with new ideas. Which is what Saskatchewan
will need after four terms under a tired,
expended, incompetent, corrupt and innumerate
government led by ministers like Mr. Harrison.
Second, as we will discuss below, this exchange
is what this team of Saskatchewan New
Democrat MLAs are capable of -- and owe
voters: a determined, on-point, memorable and
witty opposition that connects with voters.
Conservatives have weaponized a caricature of
health policy implemented thirty years ago to
deflect debate and to avoid accountability for
their own record over the past fourteen years.
Page | 17

Millions of dollars’ worth of unanswered
conservative attack ads has been deployed over
four election cycles around a populist rightwing
“big lie” about health policy in Saskatchewan.
What is the substance of this?
The former NDP government’s 1992 and 1993
budgets were designed by the late Ed
Tchorzewski – Finance Minister at the time, a
principled New Democrat and career
schoolteacher, clear in his mind that he was
proposing temporary economies to save public
services from bankruptcy after the last period of
conservative mismanagement, corruption, and
waste.
Many measures were hotly debated, but this
approach overall enjoyed wide public support
and led to the government’s re-election with a
majority in 1995. The NDP then remained in
office for twelve more years.
●

●

On health care, almost all facilities at issue
remained open, arguably in more effective
roles. The “Saskatchewan Party” certainly
thinks so, since not one has been restored as
a “hospital” during the current 14 years of
SP rule.
By saving the province from the near
bankruptcy brought on by conservatives
when they were last in office, the
Saskatchewan NDP saved our hospitals and
health facilities throughout the province.

The current government sometimes rolls school
closures implemented in the 1990s into their
messaging.
•

Thirty years ago, school closures were
decided by division boards based on
enrollment and viability, not by the
provincial government.

•

But things are different now: school closures
are now effectively decided by Mr. Moe’s
conservatives, since the SP during their
current stint in office stripped school boards
of a great deal of their autonomy by
removing local division taxing authority.

These unanswered attacks by our opponents
have damaged a key part of our party’s
brand – our role as founders and sustainers
of medicare.
As we have seen, many of our current MLAs
and candidates were in grade school thirty years
ago. And many of them told us they were
intensely frustrated to be held accountable by
our political opponents for a cartoon of policies
implemented when they were children and
teenagers. But many candidates, especially in
rural ridings, nonetheless told us that these
themes were successfully weaponized by the SP
and dominated their exchanges with too many
voters.
Why weren’t these attacks rebutted effectively?
In the view of many party activists we spoke to,
in recent election cycles the NDP consciously
chose not to respond to this multi-million dollar,
determined and long-term effort by its political
opponents to deflect attention from their own
record. The NDP did this on the theory that it
should not do battle on the issues chosen by its
opponent, that “when you’re explaining you’re
losing”, and that these issues are “ancient history
no longer relevant with the passage of time”.
Our election results over the past three cycles
suggest this was unwise – and that an effective
response like the one mounted by our caucus a
few weeks ago would have served us better
during recent election campaigns.
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(4) The NDP has too
often missed voters’
deep concern about
jobs.
The party has been too light on jobs and
people’s concerns about their economic
security, the principal concern of many
voters. The Saskatchewan economy has been
built on resource development and on
agriculture. In recent election campaigns the
NDP has accepted the erroneous perception that
conservatives are more credible on economic
issues, and that the party should focus on health
and public services in its campaigning because
of our relative strength in those areas compared
to the SP. This has left the Saskatchewan NDP
(which, unlike most other NDP provincial
sections, oversaw the construction of the
provincial economy for most of its postwar
history) not persuasively addressing the
principal concern of most voters – their jobs and
their economic future.

The NDP caught it in both ears on what it did
campaign on. The NDP set out in recent
election cycles to contrast itself with the
government by “putting people first” –
proposing to invest in public services, while
conservatives cut services. The SP conservatives
counterattacked the investment proposals by
asking “how will this all be paid for?” In the
view of several activists speaking to us, this was
the only line in the 2020 leader’s debate that
stuck with voters, despite what almost all who
spoke to us felt was a strong performance by
Ryan Meili.
The conservatives also countered our attacks on
their past and future cuts successfully, by relitigating the NDP’s 1990s health reform,
without effective rebuttal. In this way, the
government politically had its cake and ate it
too, simultaneously attacking the NDP for
claimed reckless spending to come and for past
cutting of spending. Both sides of this attack
were repeatedly and simultaneously put to our
canvassers by voters at the door in 2020 (“How
will you pay for all this?” alongside “The NDP
can’t be trusted because you cut spending”).
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(5) Too many working
people no longer see the
NDP as their party.
Since 2007 there has been a growing disconnect
between working people and our party. This is a
trend impacting social democratic parties
throughout the industrialized democracies from
Australia to Europe to North America. In our
meetings many views were offered on this
concern: perceptions that we no longer support

resource industries, economic development, and
new jobs; the perceived federal NDP role in the
Liberals’ minority Parliament; too much focus
on marginalized communities; fears of
“expensive” policy proposals with tax increases;
and the factors noted in points 1-4 above.
Of note was the most common message given to
us by trade union leaders, candidates and others:
that we are perceived by too many potential
supporters as detached from their economic
concerns, Saskatchewan’s development and the
need for more good jobs.
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(6) The NDP has been
marginalized and vilified
in rural Saskatchewan.
Many of our party’s campaigners in rural ridings
told us they faced a hostile atmosphere in rural
Saskatchewan, created by over a decade of
unanswered negative campaigning from the SP
conservatives.
Some candidates reported being aggressively
vilified and harassed at the doorstep and on the
street. Supporters in some communities were
reluctant to take signs out of concern they and
their families would be retaliated against by
neighbours. Voters repeated lines verbatim from
unanswered conservative attack ads at the door.
In some areas, candidates were reluctant to stand
until just before the campaign period, to
minimize their exposure.
For too long, we have allowed this decline of
our rural base - a base we have built our party on
since the 1920s. We have seen a drop in
membership, less active communications and
engagement with supporters, and a growing
disconnect with economic and social changes.
The party has failed to fully deal with the
changes in agriculture, the growing
proportion of workers in many smaller cities
and rural communities, and the changing
needs of those communities.
In consequence, an important and growing
portion of rural working-class voters are
aligning with conservatives.
With the concentration of agriculture into the
hands of a relative handful of landowners, most

people in rural Saskatchewan have become
resource workers, waged agricultural workers,
service sector employees, or public sector
employees – as a former leader told us these are
“all natural NDP constituencies”. Yet, many
rural working-class families believe the SP over
the NDP.
Why?
A strong majority of people in rural
communities have been persuaded to fear a
return to NDP government, on the SP claims that
the party seeks a quick end to the oil and gas
industry, and places environmental goals ahead
of mining, forestry, and other resource
development. This is a too-common perception –
that we are threatening the industries that have
provided rural Saskatchewan with hope, with
capital, with new jobs, and with an economic
future after farming transitioned to its current
form.
In a number of rural ridings, the newly formed
separatist “Buffalo Party” competed for votes.
Although this new party is probably of greater
concern in the long term to the conservative
government than to us, its ability to appeal to
working class voters underlines the price the
NDP is paying for failing to sufficiently address
the core concern of these voters – their jobs and
economic future.
The work of the Agriculture and Rural Life
Committee (ARC) is a welcome change in the
right direction for our party and is providing
hope that more engagement and better
organization can change our fortunes in rural
Saskatchewan.
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(7) The COVID Pandemic
helped the government.
As the pandemic progressed throughout last
October, there were opportunities for us to
effectively expose the government’s response
shortcomings and that was done. But with case
counts low until almost E-Day, those challenges
were not that salient for most voters (in line with
other provincial campaigns in British Columbia
and New Brunswick, where incumbent
governments also had the advantage). As we
have all seen the situation has changed
dramatically after E-Day.
But with the COVID restrictions in place, there
were many downsides for us in terms of
mobilization and organization, particularly with
volunteer and staff recruitment and with voter

turnout. Many First Nations were in complete
lockdown at various critical periods. The
curtailment of door-to-door canvassing for
several months is another key example, but just
one of many important impediments to our
ability to actively campaign and mobilize
constituency teams.
Too many voters in our universe of potential
supporters were either relatively satisfied with
the situation due to the low number of COVID
cases before the second wave hit, or they stayed
home and did not vote because they feared
contact with other people.
The various limitations on door knocking, phone
banking, Leader’s tour events, constituency
meetings and other group activities all had the
same impact of limiting our profile, our contact
with voters, and our momentum. These factors
all helped a stable, incumbent government.
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(8) Too many people saw
us addressing too many
issues.
Our interviews often brought out strong opinions
that the full written platform and the campaign
messaging were trying to deal with too many
issues, for too many different audiences.
Frequently, the same folks who said this to us
often added that the platform should have also
included one more key item!
That tendency is a trait that we are all guilty of.
But often it does not lead to effective
connections with people who are looking at us to
deal with core issues such as jobs, their family’s
economic security, health care and education.
Most voters are usually not interested in a long
list.
Often, a long list triggers concerns regarding
possible tax hikes. Those are concerns that we
must fully anticipate and address with solid

information about who is really carrying the tax
load under Scott Moe’s SP regime.
Our core campaign messages must speak to
voters’ top priorities, based on our values and
theirs. The campaign’s communications
emphasis simply cannot include everything
that is in the platform itself.
At the same time, we almost always need a
platform to outline, in somewhat greater detail,
our goals for changes in the event that we are
chosen to form a government.
Therefore, the panel sees the challenge as
balancing the campaign’s day to day
communication focus on core issues with the
development of a platform that speaks to voters
more broadly on a wider range of issues and
concerns that may be more specific and perhaps
more localized. While that balance in 2020 was
not always achieved in the eyes of many we met
with, the panel also recognizes that the platform
was also addressing the important strategic goal
of showing the contrast between our
commitments and the record and priorities of our
conservative opponents.
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(9) Voters want us to
stand up for them,
regardless of federal
party politics.
Many Saskatchewan New Democrats told us
that the federal NDP has reinforced the
provincial party’s problems on economic issues
and made it more difficult to connect with
working class voters in both urban and rural
seats. In their view, the federal party has not
been effective at defending itself or counterattacking its conservative opponents in this
province.

In the result, the federal NDP’s positions on
resource development and energy infrastructure
(including proposed pipelines in prairie
provinces) have damaged the provincial party’s
brand and political prospects in Saskatchewan.
In the last election cycle, the federal party’s
support for the federal government’s carbon tax
was also profiled by our conservative opponents,
as were the federal party’s confidence votes in
Parliament.
The federal party’s handling of Erin Weir, a
federal Saskatchewan MP, also concerned some
of the members who spoke to us.
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(10) Conservatives have
successfully targeted all
of the NDP’s postgovernment leaders.
The SP conservatives have used their
fundraising advantage to personally discredit
three successive NDP opposition leaders.
Elections in good part are referendums on
leaders. Conservatives in Saskatchewan
understand this well and have focused much of
their fundraising advantage on discrediting a
succession of NDP leaders since the party went
into opposition in 2007. Here again
conservatives are repaying the NDP in its own
coin – the NDP won in 1991 by
comprehensively discrediting the Devine
regime; the NDP won the 2003 election in good
part by seizing on a gaffe made by SP leader
Elwin Hermanson and discrediting him. Favours

that have been returned with interest over the
past four election cycles.
NDP campaigns have neither successfully
defended their leaders, nor responded effectively
to the cards that were thus dealt. A number of
activists speaking to us noted that the
conservative playbook of personally targeting
whoever leads the NDP is now entirely
predictable and needed a much more effective
response.
High turnover in the leadership meant less
effectiveness for the party. Since 2007 the NDP
has had six permanent and interim opposition
leaders and leader’s staff teams. Dwain
Lingenfelter served until 2011, John Nilson until
2013, Cam Broten until 2016, Trent
Wotherspoon until 2017, Nicole Sarauer until
2018, and now Ryan Meili – on average, a new
acting or permanent leader every 26 months.
This has, in many ways, served the conservative
government very well indeed.
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(11) The collapse of
Saskatchewan’s media
strongly benefits the
government.
Rowing against hostile media is nothing new for
the Saskatchewan NDP – but the state of the
media in the province has become a matter of
urgent public interest.
The province’s former newspapers (the “Sifton
press”) were once among the party’s most
formidable and obsessed adversaries. Tommy
Douglas countered them by speaking to voters
directly on radio.
Those newspapers are now shadows of their
former selves. Saskatchewan’s daily newspapers
were strip-mined by American vulture fund
investors. Their community advertising,
newsrooms and readership then collapsed. Their
role as the voices of communities here in
Saskatchewan was discredited by front-page
partisan political editorials written for them in
Toronto.
Commercial radio and TV newsrooms are a
thing of the past – radio’s contribution to
provincial politics is now the partisan views of
an American-style right-wing talk radio host
who is an unembarrassed former Conservative
MP and a political intimate of the current
government. Press Progress recently reported
that the dominant corporate owner of
Saskatchewan’s radio stations
(Rawlco/Rawlinson) donated over $300,000 to
the SP conservatives between 2006 and 2018.
The CBC could compensate. But conservatives
understand this, and obsessively attack the
public broadcaster in the same manner Donald
Trump railed against independent accountability.
The current national conservative leader
proposes to close the CBC television network if
elected. The present Liberal government in
Ottawa for reasons of its own has not corrected a
long period of defunding, and in consequence

the CBC’s local news efforts and audiences have
eroded.
Only community weekly newspapers retain a
healthy relationship with their audiences.
None of this is a positive development. It has
almost emptied the press gallery in the
provincial legislature. This has resulted in the
shrinking of detailed coverage, investigative
enquiry and serious commentary on provincial
politics and public issues, notwithstanding the
efforts of a handful of hardworking survivors.
That is entirely to the benefit of the incumbent
conservative government, which now governs
with little independent public accountability.
Getting to this point is why today’s
conservatives throughout the western world
obsessively attack the “fake news” media even
when, in their editorial sections, the same outlets
are often servile enablers of conservative rule.
Populist, Americanized modern conservatives
like the ones operating on the Canadian prairies
do not want objective professional journalists or
nonpartisan commentators enquiring into their
doings on any terms.
We note a pattern of message alignment:
At election time in recent cycles, there is a
notable alignment between some of the content
circulated by the SP war room, dark money
third-party conservative groups, at least one
Conservative MP using House of Commons
mailing privileges, and the province’s media. In
the 2020 election, for example, the aligned
message was that the election would be about
holding the NDP accountable for its 1990s
record in office, at a time when many of the
NDP’s candidates were schoolchildren – a
theme concurrently reinforced in the SP’s “big
lie” attack ads.
Leaders’ debates are sometimes an opportunity
for a challenger to equalize a money advantage
by their opponent. Jack Layton, for example,
vaulted into official opposition in 2011 with the
help of a well-framed debate performance.
Rachel Notley solidified her victory in 2015 in
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Alberta with a sparkling debate performance. To
suppress this risk, on the day after the 2020
Saskatchewan leader’s debate, in which Ryan
Meilli performed well, the province’s major
newspapers focused on a political poll they had

fielded before people had heard the debate –
largely ignoring the public interest in the issues
debated, and helping the conservatives suppress
any effect the debate might have had on public
opinion.
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(12) The party withered
in power and further
withered in opposition.

But as the overall fundraising numbers show,
corporate donors in and out of province are
prepared to fund conservative governments
much more generously, particularly between
elections.

The NDP failed to tend to its grassroots, and so
they too have withered. Periods in power can be
opportunities for a political party to build out
and to stock up for an inevitable future period in
opposition, as the party did in Alberta under
Rachel Notley. That did not happen here.
Instead, the party withered in office. Many
constituency associations lost their ability to
function without an MLA, and as the caucus
shrunk, so did the party at the local level. The
withering of the party can be seen in many ways
– notably in its political, membership and
financial results, outlined in the tables above.

As a result, while the NDP has managed to put
together somewhat reasonable budgets during
election years, it sometimes collapsed into
relative inactivity between elections. The
conservatives have been generously funded
every year and have massively outraised the
NDP, every year.
•

To survive as a legislative party, the NDP
focused its relatively meager financial
resources on winnable ridings in cities.

A few other elements worth highlighting:

This meant, in essence, ceding a majority of the
province to the conservatives for over a decade
with the results we see.

•

•

Our repeated, lengthy leadership races
sapped the party of its focus and
resources.

Party executives and organizers across Canada
have bought into the myth that long leadership
races provide political parties with an
opportunity to grow their membership and
fundraising base. The Saskatchewan NDP is an
excellent demonstration of the folly of this.
Lengthy internal warfare over leadership
exhausts political leaders and activists; builds
internal tensions and division; wastes
fundraising resources on internal campaigning
and debate; and produces too many one-time
members and one-time donors who do not renew
after the leadership convention is over. Long,
paralyzing internal leadership debates are
exactly what our conservative opponents
wanted, and we obliged.
•

The party unwisely failed to reform
political fundraising rules while in office,
perhaps because the corporate sector
provided the party itself with relatively
generous contributions.

Internal party meetings frustrated and
demobilized members and deterred new
recruits.

Very few of the activists we spoke to believe
that the party’s meetings and governance inspire
new members, build political momentum, or
play any meaningful role in its key decisions.
As is the case in many sections, our conventions
are now paralyzed by procedural disputes and
agenda debates – which are often the visible sign
of efforts by the party to sideline unwiselydrafted policy motions that would feed the
narratives of our political opponents.
Thus, like leadership races, conventions in their
current form have become an expensive
instrument to further erode the party rather than
to build it.
•

Many members feel that party
membership has been reduced to
receiving fundraising emails.

Without accessible, regular, and meaningful
ways to participate in political activities between
elections, party membership in the
Saskatchewan NDP has, in the perceptions of
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many, largely become an opportunity to receive
a torrent of daily provincial and federal
fundraising emails – and an invitation to help
with canvassing, once every four years. It is a
remarkable tribute to the determination of the
Saskatchewan NDP’s membership that almost
10,000 of them endure this and retain their
cards, hoping for better days.

fundraising, local campaign planning,
community outreach and recruitment, and
community policy development has increasingly
fallen to a corporal’s guard of constantly
changed central staff, small local volunteer
teams, and then to a relative handful of out-ofprovince campaign workers working in ridings
for a few weeks at election time.

But while waiting for those better days, the real
work of organizing, candidate recruitment,

Our results underline that this must change.
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(13) Blending the work of
the Agricultural and
Rural Life Committee
(ARC) with the central
campaign and the
platform was only partly
successful.
As noted in many of our meetings, ARC
represents a vibrant example of grassroots
member initiative and hard work - one to draw
strength from going forward. Considering crossover memberships on Provincial Council, ARC
has a significant voice in the current governance
of the party. In the rural context, the 2020
election cycle was distinguished by the proactive
efforts of ARC to prod party thinking about
policy that would speak, from the perspective of
ARC’s dozens of members, to the needs and
future of rural Saskatchewan. There were also
ARC communications initiatives (such as op eds
in local papers).
ARC also made good use of technology to
bring together people spread around the
province to arrive at collaborative agreement
around policy recommendations, to connect
on matters of common interest, and to offer
mutual support - even before Zoom became a
household word after COVID-19 broke out. On
the latter (mutual support) front, the Panel heard
from a good number of rural candidates who
were grateful to ARC and specific ARC leaders
for support online as they struggled with both
campaign logistics and the challenges of facing
considerable hostility in some rural areas. These
efforts paralleled considerable support provided
to candidates by the Saskatchewan New
Democrat Women wing as well as the guidance
and support for rural candidates that the central
campaign team was able to provide.
In 2019 and 2020, ARC representatives worked
through various party processes to influence
decisions on policy and platform and developed
significant written submissions such as a

document entitled Healthy Communities. While
it is not possible to document the extensive back
and forth exchanges, it is important to note that
there was frustration and concern that the
perspectives offered by ARC were not fully
embraced in the central decision processes.
In the context of a tradition of grassroots
activism in the Saskatchewan CCF and NDP and
of a desire to help the party reconnect with rural
Saskatchewan, ARC and Provincial Council
members were working from the perspective of
democratic engagement in policy development.
The central party and campaign team needed to
integrate this with the purposes and realities of
election platform formulation. A platform is the
entry-point for an election communications
strategy that increases the chance of striking a
chord with voters in a way that produces
winning campaigns. Platforms also provide a
framework for the civil service to develop
ministry by ministry plans for an incoming
government, especially when an opposition
party replaces the incumbent. A lot of research,
consultation, expert policy judgment and
strategic political judgment must come together
in the decisions made around the content,
presentation and roll-out of a platform that
contains good policy based on accurate data, is
fiscally sound, and is likely to produce the
outcomes desired.
The Panel often heard from those who were not
ARC members just how much ARC’s work and
grassroots spirit was deeply appreciated, even as
it was felt by some that ARC had some
unrealistic expectations of how detailed a
platform should be on specific issues, including
energy and climate protection. We also heard
from some that they felt the ARC proposals
reflected “more NDP gospel than rural realities”.
The ARC efforts to influence policy and the
response of the central team should not be
viewed in isolation. These were not the only
policy consultations in which the central team
was involved and the general challenges of
developing an effective platform affected the
central campaign’s relations with ARC.
Alongside ARC’s participation, it is important to
note that, this time around, there was
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considerable engagement (perhaps notably the
Battlefords conference in 2019). As well, the
platform team also made diligent efforts to meet
with all sitting MLAs.

said, many – including from urban ridings –
expressed concerns to us that there was simply
not enough rural content and strategy in the
platform and campaign.

In that regard, it is important to know that ARC
efforts were listened to. In terms of ARC’s
initiatives in writing and placing op eds articles
and leaflets, the campaign welcomed these in
general terms. As for platform impact, it seems
likely to the Panel, for example, that ARC’s
advocacy around rural telecommunications
connectivity was a factor in its inclusion in the
platform, even if it did not receive as much
emphasis in the campaign as hoped for. That

ARC’s efforts tell a story of democratic energy.
Even as many rural riding associations were
struggling to meet campaign demands, the
province-wide ARC was there - and will
continue to be there - to put rural Saskatchewan
more firmly on the party’s political map. Their
outreach methods and their person-power are a
solid foundation on which to build, as new and
much-needed rural strategies and actions are
developed.
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(14) Our voter universe
has shrunk and so has
turnout: both help the
conservatives.
As shown by the figures in section 1 of Part 1,
the percentage of eligible voters who come out
to vote fell off a cliff in 1995, dropping to 57%
from the 77% turnout in 1991. It has since then
only crept above 60% once, and that was 60.8%
in the change election of 2007 when the
Saskatchewan Party conservatives first came to
power. Since 2007, the vote has hovered close to
50%: 51.1% (2011); 53.5% (2016); and 52.8%
(2020).
It is worth noting that conservatives do better
when voter turnout is lower. Before the 2020
election, publicly available polling did indeed
reveal that a significant percentage of
Saskatchewan voters, well beyond 50%, had
tired of the SP and had no particularly strong
loyalty to, let alone affection for, the party.
It seems likely that a slice of those voters was
presumptively still going to vote SP in 2020, but
did want the SP to be counterbalanced by a more
numerous Opposition because a range of
concerns had developed in their minds. Internal
polling data suggests a considerable number of
others were potential switch voters to the NDP
at the start of the election.
Even though overall voter turnout was down
by only 0.7% in 2020 as compared to 2016
(and indeed up by 1.7% from 2011), that
number could well represent the difference
between the Saskatchewan NDP having won
the 13 seats it did and taking an additional
three to eight if we had been more successful
in getting out the vote in those ridings lost by
a small number of votes.
One can always muse about this after an
election, and sometimes it is clear that efforts
left nothing on the table and there were simply
no more votes to be found. However, the Panel
believes that COVID hesitancy and a general

lack of motivation from some clearly identified
supporters to vote on election day (perhaps
caused in part by polls that may have made
voting feel beside the point) were salient factors
in those close ridings.
Beyond the handful of close ridings, however, it
would be a stretch to say that election turnout
was a particular factor for this election any more
than for all the elections with reduced turnout in
recent years. In general, failure of most
potential switch voters to stay in the
Saskatchewan NDP voter universe by the end of
the election reflects the general factors,
discussed throughout our findings, that have
caused the NDP to lose voter share at the same
time as low turnouts have become the norm.
Of great significance to Saskatchewan’s future is
the relatively low turnout in many Indigenous
communities (impacted significantly by COVID
lockdowns in this election). While we must
never take for granted that Indigenous voters
have a strong preference for the NDP, our
positions on a range of issues do justify saying
there is far more affinity between the NDP and
Indigenous voters’ values and interests than the
Saskatchewan Party. With three very capable
Indigenous leaders as MLAs in the new caucus,
alongside many energetic Indigenous activists
and the 2020 election’s Indigenous candidates, a
strong foundation for strengthened engagement
is in place.
We also know that Saskatchewan is changing.
More newcomers are coming in. The province is
getting younger. Inequality is growing and has
been deepened by COVID impacts. Suburban
women can be expected to show increasingly
limited patience with the reactionary
conservatism, machismo, and poor role models
that plague the SP conservatives. Indigenous
people are becoming a larger and larger share of
the overall population. Too many workers have
drifted away from us, but there is much room for
the NDP - the party of working people - to do
the hard work of winning back a big chunk of
that vote, in partnership with trade unions and
other allies. All these changes open possibilities
for higher voter engagement and turnout, but
only with strong actions from the NDP.
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(15) Party resources and
capacities are
inadequate to bring
victory.
There has been an absence of internal party
renewal and re-organization since the 2007
defeat, even as there has been a lot of change in
Leaders, senior staff, and MLAs. We see
evidence of a ‘missing generation’ of activists,
constituency leaders, and election staff as the
recruitment, mobilization, training, and
mentoring required for renewal in various
capacities just did not occur at sufficient levels
between 2007 and 2020.
Pre-election preparations in 2020 did not
overcome the challenges of the point above as
there is a significant gap between the needs and
the capacities. That is, the party is not meeting
the needs for more constituency organizing and
communications support, for Indigenous
organizing, for outreach to communities and
social sectors, for rural organizing, and for
advertising between elections, to name just

some. We need more resources, more trained
and experienced staff and volunteers, more
strategic planning, and more funding. These
gaps further illustrate the need for increased
activity at all levels in the years between
elections, including expanded fundraising and
membership. The 2020 campaign also
demonstrated that there is a need for tighter
communications between the central and the
constituency campaigns about responsibilities
and roles of each level in terms of specific
campaign components.
Of particular importance is the party’s
capacities in the world of online campaigning.
In principle, digital campaigning could be an
equalizer, balancing the conservatives’ out-ofprovince and corporate fundraising
advantages. While 2020 saw a much improved
and expanded digital campaign overall, more
can and must be done going forward. As well,
there must be very close alignment between the
central online activities and those at the
constituency level, with early and shared
planning, significant training, clear reporting,
and larger budgets at both levels before and
during the election campaign.
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(16) Youth involvement
in the party has
declined.
Throughout the history of the NDP, across
provincial sections and federally, youth
members have been crucial to the party’s energy
and generational rejuvenation. A significant
number of active constituency leaders, party
staff, and MLAs have, over the years, entered
the Saskatchewan NDP through Youth Wing
membership and activities.

Of serious operational concern is the gradual
diminishment of staff opportunities for youth,
which is a key source of experience and
inspiration for short- and long- term
involvement (a smaller caucus and smaller party
means fewer opportunities). There does not
appear to be a concerted, province-wide effort to
recruit younger activists for organizational roles
and to develop mentorships for key positions
such as campaign managers.

The Panel spoke to a number of NDP members
in their late teenage years and in their twenties.
Apart from the SYND representatives, young
people were part of many of the Panel’s group
sessions and spoke often and with keen
observations.

In comparison to other periods, there also has
been a limited number of Saskatchewan youth
gaining campaign experience in other provinces.
The number of ridings in Saskatchewan
compared to population makes it difficult to
always have youth in key roles in every
constituency. But it appears that this challenge
has been worsened by a missing generation or
two of organizers due to fewer young New
Democrats becoming activists in recent years.

There was much evidence of young people
playing essential roles as campaign volunteers,
as campaign staff, and indeed as candidates.
This was more obviously the case in urban
ridings as the volunteer core of most rural
ridings are in their 60s and onward. This does
not mean youth were absent in rural campaigns
— indeed, a good number of impressive rural
candidates were younger.

We were told several times by younger New
Democrats that their generations are
increasingly best understood as doers not
joiners. They will join a protest or solidarity
event, or organize an event, as an active
commitment to values or a cause — such as
climate change, standing up for the struggles
signified by #BlackLivesMatter, or bringing
attention to Indigenous suicides.

At the same time as many youths are active in
the party, there is a consensus that youth
involvement is considerably less than
historically the case. Campus clubs have gone
defunct, with new efforts to revive them now
underway. The Youth Wing reports that it is
treading water, with limited integration into the
overall affairs of the party and with limited
success in attracting new members. It is worth
noting that the Youth Wing has a special
replenishment challenge as compared to other
wings - youth do not stay that way and age out,
and many younger adults tend not to identify as
“youth.”

Less and less do they find satisfaction in simply
joining a party, especially if, as more than one
youth noted, they think that party membership
equals “meetings” versus “action”. NDP youth
are encountering this recruitment challenge and
the central party has not acted to systematically
counteract this decline, although the summer
intern program has been a critical and successful
step in that direction. The gaps in youth
recruitment, involvement, training and
mentorship are significant and must be more
fully addressed.
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(17) The process of
vetting and nominating
candidates needs
strengthening and
improvement.
Various aspects of the overall process of
nominating and vetting candidates and of
approving nomination meetings were criticized
by many of the members that we interviewed.
Much of the criticism arises from conflicting
understandings about what the centre should be
managing and what are the responsibilities of
constituencies in terms of candidate
nominations. Some of this divergence arises
from the grassroots traditions of the CCF and
NDP colliding with newer dynamics that have
arisen with more polarizing campaigns, social
media, and greater influence of ‘big media’
compared to local constituency media outlets.

●

There are some important strategic issues
that justify what the party was trying to do in
terms of nominations:
•

The party was seeking to present a slate of
candidates that was gender-balanced and
diverse - and succeeded;

•

People who are interested in standing for
public office are typically talkative on social
media, and political war rooms feast on
unwise posts to undermine opposing
campaigns. Candidates’ backgrounds are
part of the party’s credibility. Through the
vetting process the party needed to
understand its risks when determining
whether to allow a candidate to represent it.
We just need to recall the NDP’s 2016
campaign challenges, the media coverage
and the SP’s successes in that regard to
appreciate the need for thorough vetting and
serious consideration of candidate
approvals;

•

Timing of nomination meetings is part of a
provincial strategy, not just a local
constituency decision. Other criteria such as
local candidate search, membership levels,
voter contact activities and fundraising
targets are linked with timing as part of the
provincial strategy;

•

In principle, filling a slate with enthusiastic
but often low-profile local activists prevents
the party from finding nominations for
higher-profile candidates who would not be
able to campaign as NDP candidates until
closer to the writ – local mayors and
councilors, for example.

The criticisms the panel heard are addressed in
the recommendations we make, and those are
guided by the overriding need for close
alignment between the centre and the
constituencies with respect to the nomination
process. They cannot be in conflict and must be
addressed early to avoid that.
The main concerns raised were:
●

too many candidates were nominated too
late;

●

the vetting process and criteria were not
clear enough and there was no appeal
process;

●

the considerations behind the scheduling of
nomination meetings by the EPC and the
Provincial Executive was not always fully
communicated and/or understood by
constituency executives and candidates for
nomination, and those considerations were
often seen by local activists as more
properly to be a constituency decision;

the provincial party’s policies and strategies
to seek diversity within our candidate slate
were not always fully communicated and/or
understood by constituency executives and
candidates for nomination and were often
seen as more “central interference”, rather
than as an ongoing provincial policy that
had been widely discussed and accepted
over the years at conventions.
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Although we believe the party was acting for
valid reasons, we must report that many activists
believed that the late nominations in particular
left them dead on arrival during the campaign, in
many rural areas. Certainly, the opportunity cost
was very great. Too many of our constituency
associations folded over the past 20 years as
they lost their MLAs and after the SP took
power. Dropping candidates into local

campaigns a week or two before the writ was the
cherry on the cake with respect to the issues
discussed above – increasing the chance of
failure and defeat.
A final critical point: in recent cycles, few
candidates who lived this experience remained
engaged after the election to build their
constituency associations.

Page | 36

(18) The bottom line: We
did not materially
improve on our 2016
vote.
This was so even though the 2020 NDP
campaign was well-managed by its central
campaign staff, we seemed to be generating
positive momentum in public domain polls
and we had many strong local campaigns.
In many ways, 2020 was a good campaign for
the Saskatchewan NDP: many members
volunteered that the most recent campaign was
the best-managed, smoothest run and most
supportive campaign they had seen in recent
memory. Others disagreed.
Senior staff reported that they worked well
together as a team, got along, executed the tasks
they were assigned effectively, and were proud
of their work. Many ridings observed they were
much better supported than in recent campaigns.
Many constituency campaigns had stronger
efforts than in other elections and we gained
vote share in many of those. However, that was
not a fully consistent trend despite great efforts
by candidates, trade union allies, staff and
volunteers.
Losing two to one hurts. But these results are not
rooted in the effort or the hours put in by
campaign staff, most of whom were given only
months or weeks to contribute to the effort.
Many staff members reminded us that public
domain polls and a good deal of media
commentary suggested that the Saskatchewan
NDP was going to be erased from the
Legislature or reduced to a rump in this election,
during a COVID epidemic that strongly
favoured incumbent governments of all stripes.
Instead, the party held its ground, its caucus, and
its vote, and re-elected its leader for the first
time since 2007. We have several new MLAs
and a caucus that has eight women and three
Indigenous MLAs.

Members of this panel have seen far worse
results. For example, a BC election that reduced
the NDP (currently back in government) to two
seats. Our Quebec campaigns in the not toodistant past celebrated increases in votes from
1% to 2%.
Now is a time for all friends of the
Saskatchewan NDP to return to our work. And
for hard work to be thanked – like the work of
our 2020 campaign team led by director Trevor
McKenzie-Smith, caucus chief of staff Adrienne
King, and provincial secretary John Tzupa; the
efforts of all our candidates; support from the
trade union movement; the sacrifices of our
legions of constituency organizers and
volunteers; and of course, the generous support
of our donors. Some campaign managers and
senior campaign staff even joined this work
from out-of-province – these party colleagues
spent many long nights far from home to help
the party in Saskatchewan. They, and all our
team, deserve our thanks for the effort they put
into this campaign.
It is also true that measured by the final vote
itself and burdened as it was by the deep and
long-term issues outlined above, the party did
not materially improve on its 2016 result.
•

The SP conservatives received 61.12% of
the vote, a 1.41% decrease from 2016.

•

The NDP received 31.82% of the vote, a
1.52% increase from 2016.

•

We lost good incumbent MLAs and other
constituencies that we have frequently held
in the past.

Public domain polls over the course of the
campaign reported a small bump in voting
intentions as voters assessed the respective
leaders’ tours, debate performances, paid
advertisements, digital messages, and local
campaigns. But that did not translate at the ballot
box overall – remembering that, as we showed
above, the party is recovering its vote in urban
and suburban constituencies and holding our
strong leads in the far North.
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It can be credibly argued that this campaign did
achieve an important strategic goal – the
Saskatchewan NDP avoided being wiped off the
map, in an election in which its opponent got
61% of the vote. We have a more well-known
Leader, a very credible new caucus and a solid
base vote.
But what political parties in official opposition
owe voters is a compelling prosecution of the
incumbent government and a presentation of a
credible alternative government. Political parties
should not be playing for bronze, they should
play to win.
That is particularly true here. The
Saskatchewan NDP is the cathedral of social
democracy in North America – the seedbed of

much of what Canadians think of as the heart
of their citizenship.
It is time to wipe the mud off our record, flung
at it by a tired, incompetent, corrupt and
increasingly bankrupt conservative government.
It is time to speak clearly and directly to the core
issues that working families care most about,
whether in urban, suburban, Indigenous or rural
communities.
And it is time to correct internal mistakes that
distract us from this work. The party has a deep
well of talent and support in the province, much
of which has been sitting out recent cycles. It is
time for homecoming – of all of the friends of
the Saskatchewan NDP.
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Part 3: Recommendations for Change
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(1) We need to match the
SP’s permanent
campaign with our own.
We Recommend:
(1.1) A campaign for four years to match the
SP’s permanent campaigning: we must
recognize that we cannot win in just 28 days or
even 28 weeks. This approach requires more
resources, planning, work, and imagination to
make our actions and our smaller budgets more
effective. Happily, our activists want to be more
active in political action - and not just for 28
days but more regularly. So let’s harness that
energy where it is most needed: taking our
issues to the people as often and as effectively as
possible.
(1.2) Critiques of government corruption and
failures by the Leader and MLAs must be
strongly reinforced and supported by party
activities and resources to take those messages
directly to people. At all levels of the party we
must ramp up grassroots communications, voter
contact, and community engagement to make
our criticisms stick and disqualify the SP, just as
the NDP did when Grant Devine was the
premier. This would include social media work,
Coffee Row communications, leaflet
distribution, canvassing, letters to editors, call-in
shows, etc.
(1.3) A digital strategy that is state-of-the-art,
effectively implemented, and nimbly adjusted as
lessons are learned. This is especially crucial as
a strategy for connecting with, and across, the
geographically spread-out ridings of rural
Saskatchewan and the increasingly diverse
communities in urban and suburban
constituencies. Importantly, such digital
campaigning must go beyond one-way flows of
information and include genuine interactive
engagement with our members, with those most
clearly in our voter universe, and with the people
of Saskatchewan as a whole.

(1.4) We suggest the party relaunch The
Commonwealth as a regular e-magazine. We
suggest “Coffee Row” be relaunched as a
regular source of information and political
talking points. We suggest a weekly email with
party news, without a word of fundraising
content. Our goal is to develop party
membership that is more than fundraising
emails, with more political information flow,
more opportunities for feedback, opportunities
to campaign between elections, and social events
that are not for fundraising such as coffee
parties, MLAs’ reporting sessions and pub
nights.
(1.5) Rebuild around strong constituency
associations, strong campus clubs and strong
wings, including a plan for strong central
organization and outreach activities that utilize
the 2021 summer interns, the 2020 local
organizers, volunteers, MLAs and the 2020
candidates to establish the NDP profile and
organizational foundations in the maximum
number of constituencies in all regions.
(1.6) A strategic plan for nominations that
takes into account local and provincial candidate
search, earlier nominations, diversity of
candidates, timely vetting, and candidate support
and training. Use the nomination process as a
key tool to strengthen constituency building and
growth. (see also Recommendation 11)
(1.7) Expanded and systematic community
outreach by the Leader and MLAs to strengthen
connections and relationships with businesses,
Indigenous communities, agricultural producers,
multicultural communities, trade unions,
women’s organizations, students, LBGTQ and
Two-Spirited groups, seniors, disabled
organizations, and others.
(1.8) The priorities of the provincial office
should also reflect the ‘permanent campaign’
model, with ongoing efforts to streamline
administration and to maximize the focus of
staff time and resources on front line
campaigning.
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(1.9) A major focus on identifying a new
generation of organizers for intensive training
and on-the-ground experiences, as soon as
possible.
This can include the successful summer intern
program, elections in other provinces,
constituency-level voter contact activities, and
specialized skill-building workshops (including
at the October convention and at Council
meetings). This investment now is needed to
increase between-election political action and to
provide learning experiences in the years ahead
of the 2024 election.
(1.10) Systematic skills development and
capacities expansion with increased mentoring,
training, campaign experience, and ongoing
voter contact activities between elections,
including more support for our volunteers such
as training in delivering our messages, safety
measures (particularly for women, Indigenous
people and minorities), recognition for their

efforts, and sharing of strategies in inclusive
ways.
Finally, we need to respond to the collapse of
Saskatchewan’s media.
We recommend:
(1.11) That in all communications we do all that
is possible with what is left of the mass media.
Treat serious reporters with the respect they
deserve. Expand the Leader’s and MLAs’
engagement with weekly newspapers and other
community media outlets.
(1.12) That we invest more resources, time
and energy in talking directly to voters: go
into broadcasting with lots of podcasts, videos
and creative (and strategic) social media,
involving innovative young activists in many
languages and many communities. Fresh minds
and a new approach to message modes and
methods are required
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(2) The current
government needs to be
held accountable.

campaign. Governments in Saskatchewan are
typically defeated in detail over the full course
of their final term, and that is what needs to
happen to the current government during the
current term.

Our caucus and party should aggressively
prosecute the record, competence, ethics, and
priorities of the current government.

To illustrate, look at how our current team
aggressively took on the 2021 government
budget, and the government’s dismal record
managing COVID.

New Democrats do not always take naturally to
opposition politics. People typically get involved
in the Saskatchewan NDP to advocate for a
better deal for ordinary people and to improve
public services like health and education. But
politics is necessarily adversarial. Opposition
parties play a critical accountability role in
legislatures. And successfully prosecuting an
incumbent government is a necessary
preliminary to defeating it.
If we do not have a serious problem with the
“Saskatchewan Party” government, why should
the public?
Disqualifying the current government must
therefore be a principal focus of our caucus and
our party.
A public party report is not the place to blueprint
detailed legislative strategies but it is appropriate
for us to report the unanimous view of every
party member who addressed this matter during
our discussions: our party needs to take the fight
to the SP government and show that we intend to
replace them by doing our job as the official
opposition with clarity, focus and determination.
It is unusual to defeat a government in a 28-day

We recommend:
(2.1) We urge clarity, focus and fierce
determination in revealing and profiling the
current government’s corruption, fiscal
mismanagement, dithering, failures on the
national stage, and weak Premier and cabinet
team.
(2.2) The Leader’s and MLAs’ core messages
should be circulated broadly and rapidly
within the party following provincial budgets,
significant legislation and other key decisions in
a few easy-to-share communications products
(leaflets, social media, op-ed articles, etc.). The
Provincial Executive and senior staff should
develop a work plan for ongoing outreach and
communications that involve all levels of the
party in grassroots communications and voter
contact with these core messages.
(2.3) We also recommend the caucus and
party keep fighting to end the rule of “big
money” in Saskatchewan. Political donations
should be limited to individual voters who live
in Saskatchewan, like almost every other
province in Canada.
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(3) We must confront the
Saskatchewan Party’s
“Big Lie” about our
record.
The Saskatchewan NDP must challenge our
opponent’s lies and distortions about our
record in office.
There is room for debate about the fiscal,
economic, and social records of the Douglas,
Lloyd, Blakeney, Romanow and Calvert
governments. But there is no room for debate
about the CCF-NDP’s history on health care.
Our party founded medicare; built it;
successfully maneuvered in the national
Parliament to make it a national right of
citizenship; and then saved it in Saskatchewan
from the reckless fiscal irresponsibility of
Devine’s Conservative government - now back
in office, their hands once more in the public
cookie jar, and the provincial debt once again
out of control.
•

•

Hospitals and health centres in
Saskatchewan were saved from the
consequences of the province being brought
to the brink of bankruptcy by the Devine
Conservatives - the parents of today’s SP.
In the fourteen years it has been back in
power, the “Saskatchewan Party” has not
converted a single rural health centre into a
“hospital”. By their deeds they support these
centres in their current roles.

That our record on these issues has been
successfully muddied by the same people who
fought public medicare tooth and nail; then
bankrupted it; and now angle for its privatization
is a testament to the power of the “big lie” in
politics. And it is a testament to what happens
when you choose not to answer claims by your
political opponents. As recent events in the

United States demonstrate, populist rightwing
parties no longer fear trafficking in falsehood,
and what they say is widely believed – if what
they say is not challenged.
We recommend:
(3.1) The Saskatchewan NDP needs to tackle
the “Saskatchewan Party” on these issues.
Our caucus is off to a good start doing so, as we
discussed above. Calling out the SP
government’s big lie on medicare needs to
become an issue of their character, and their own
conduct in office. What else are they lying
about? What is it about their own term they do
not want exposed or debated?
(3.2) In support of this work, this might be a
good moment for our party to take stock of its
own history and real record. We recommend
staging an important segment of the coming
NDP convention to review and celebrate over
75 years of achievement under the Douglas,
Lloyd, Blakeney, Romanow and Calvert
CCF/NDP governments. As well, a carefully
considered information package should be
provided to new and existing members of the
party, to help them confidently rebut our
political opponents’ distortions and to take the
fight to them.
(3.3) More generally, we recommend finding
ways to restore pride and rejuvenate the
‘happy warrior’ side of the NDP – a tone we
welcome in our new caucus. For example, the
party should provide a welcome kit for new
members that highlights the NDP’s history,
record, values, and readiness to lead
Saskatchewan into the future. Just as the
convention will do, welcome packages will
facilitate team building, linking our past
achievements to present and future actions. In
our proposals on party communications set out
below, we urge other ways to provide every
NDP supporter with the real facts and the
confidence to use them from coffee row to the
lunchroom to Facebook.
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(4) We need to reconnect
with working class
voters.
Based on our meetings with trade union
representatives and many activists and
candidates in constituencies, it is clear that we
need to strengthen our connections to working
people and to Saskatchewan’s trade unions as
frontline representatives of working people.
We recommend:
(4.1) Speak directly to working class voters,
more often and about more of their priorities.
While this seems very obvious, we believe it is
worth stating explicitly because too often, we
were told in many of our meetings, including
those with trade union representatives, that the
NDP is perceived to be talking to ‘somebody
else’ and not enough to working class and
middle-class families.

(4.2) Connect with people through their
workplaces, unions, industries, and workrelated activities. In other recommendations we
reference the many ways of reaching out to more
people through organization and
communications. These steps and others
referenced in this report can bring us closer to
the everyday working families, with a great
diversity of backgrounds, that are the majority of
Saskatchewan residents.
(4.3) Increase communications and
collaboration with trade union allies, build
stronger relations and greater cooperation in
areas of shared interest, and work with them
as active participants in our goal of ‘the
permanent campaign’. This would include
party representatives learning more about their
industries, their workplaces, their concerns, and
their ideas for developing more political
involvement of their members. This would
include caucus outreach to develop priority
issues and to reach more working families where
they are at, in cooperation with their unions.
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(5) We need to squarely
address the future of
resource industries.
We observe that fossil fuel will remain a
significant energy source for many years, but its
growth rate is declining throughout the industrial
world. In that light, Saskatchewan must lead in
greater diversification, energy innovation,
energy efficiency and in provincial policies for
climate protection. The ground is shifting in the
Saskatchewan business community, as
demonstrated by the March 17, 2021, milestone
report by the Saskatchewan Chamber of
Commerce, Building the Low-carbon Economy:
Exploring Opportunities and Challenges for
Saskatchewan.
We believe that the Saskatchewan NDP must
present itself as the party that forward-thinking
business leaders will want to engage, in
preference to the SP conservatives, who are
joined at the hip with the federal Conservative
Party. The Conservatives just showed at their
national convention that its all-controlling base alongside many of its MPs and party officials has no interest in seriously addressing climate
change and pursuing the kinds of smart energy
policy that Saskatchewan needs to be at the
forefront of.
Ultimately though, the burden is on
Saskatchewan’s NDP to make the case for
why we (and social democratic economic
principles) are much better at meeting the
economic needs of people and communities
than the Devine-Wall-Moe conservatives. We
must walk the talk as we make our case,
showing by plans and actions how we in
government will both preserve and create goodpaying jobs as we move, over the next decades,
to foster new energy sources and technology in
ways that reduce our heavy economic reliance

on oil and gas, while fighting for this industry’s
and its workers’ rightful places in our national
economy.
We Recommend:
(5.1) That we make it clear that we
understand the importance of our resource
industries for jobs, revenues and economic
stability. Make it clear that it was the
Saskatchewan NDP governments that laid the
foundations of many of those jobs and we now
want to see more value-added, more
diversification, more innovation so that
Saskatchewan stays ahead. Make it clear that
we are committed to strong, made-inSaskatchewan actions to both create new jobs
and industries and to protect the climate, so that
Canada meets the Paris emission reduction goals
committed to by both of the last two Prime
Ministers, Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau.
(5.2) That our Leader and our MLAs connect
with those involved in the resource industries
and build relationships and trust. First and
foremost, this means connecting with those
working in those industries. That includes the
businesspeople grappling with the challenges of
competition in the global economy and the
nearby communities most involved in the
environmentally - sustainable extraction,
transportation and refining of Saskatchewan’s
natural resources.
(5.3) That we continue to reach out to those in
the business community who are not locked
into the cycle of inaction and short-term thinking
that has led the SP to leave Saskatchewan well
behind the curve. We must continue to connect
with workers in the energy and resource
industries and their unions to strengthen
communications and collaboration in pursuit of
job creation as innovations, energy demands and
product demand change, such as the ongoing
shift from petroleum to more electricity.
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(6) Our party needs to be
rebuilt in rural
Saskatchewan.
We Recommend:
(6.1) A renewed commitment to reconnecting
with rural residents and communities based
on active outreach, rebuilding constituency
associations and renewed two-way
communications to ensure rural Saskatchewan is
a bigger part of all NDP strategies and actions.
We believe the Agriculture and Rural Life
Committee (ARC) has taken many strong
actions to rebuild support and profile in rural
constituencies. These actions can be a key part
of ongoing renewal and rebuilding with ARC,
central bodies, our Leader and our MLAs
working together on shared, coordinated rural
initiatives.

(6.2) Creation of a workable number of rural
zones that group four to six constituencies
together for mutual support, sharing of
information and experiences, and collaboration
on activities. We suggest examining how each
zone can be connected with an MLA and/or
former MLA, who can work with them on an
ongoing basis.
(6.3) Regular zoom calls with rural
constituency leaders and activists in each zone
from central offices to strengthen two-way
communications and information sharing.
(6.4) Specific training and support for rural,
grassroots communications so that the work of
the Leader, the MLAs and the party can be more
broadly and effectively promoted within rural
communities.
(6.5) Specific efforts to work with the variety
of rural situations in applying
recommendations made in this report: one size
does not fit all constituencies.
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(7) Voters want us to
stand up for them,
regardless of federal
party politics.
Under the leadership of Tommy Douglas,
Woodrow Lloyd, Allan Blakeney, Roy
Romanow and Lorne Calvert, Saskatchewan
played an important leadership role in Canada -and fought hard and effectively for
Saskatchewan’s interests.
That is not what Saskatchewan has been getting
under the current government. Brad Wall and
Scott Moe were and remain featherweights on
the national scene, and Saskatchewan has been
punching far below its weight under the current
government. For fourteen years, Mr. Wall and
Mr. Moe focused on media stunts during
federal-provincial meetings and achieved
nothing of note on any national file – until
March 25, 2021.
On that date, in response in part to a foolish,
poorly argued reference case pursued by the
“Saskatchewan Party” government, the Supreme
Court upheld the federal government’s climate
pricing system. The decision of the SP
government not to present a viable made-inSaskatchewan emissions reduction regime led to
the most significant loss of provincial control
over natural resources since 1982, when Premier
Blakeney and then-Deputy Premier Romanow
obtained full provincial control of resources
during negotiations over the Constitution and the
Charter of Rights.

That is a lot of damage to undo.
We recommend:
(7.1) These issues should be highlighted as
part of our work holding the current government
accountable for its weakness, corruption, and
poor judgment.
(7.2) The party should consider what a betterled Saskatchewan government should be
working for on the national stage and ask for
a mandate for that agenda in the next
election.
(7.3) The “Saskatchewan Party” has tried to
deflect attention from its record of failure on the
national scene by attacking the federal NDP and
suggesting that Saskatchewan New Democrats
are somehow responsible for what the federal
NDP does in the federal Parliament. This is an
old game. The answer is to be frank in strong
disagreement with the federal NDP when it is
wrong on provincial issues – as, for example,
Alberta NDP leader Rachel Notley does - and to
not permit the current government to hide from
its own record by criticizing opposition parties
in Ottawa.
(7.4) Our party’s federal affiliation was on
the minds of, and of concern to, a number of
the members who spoke to us. The federal
party’s failure to argue its corner in
Saskatchewan - similar in some ways to our own
- is an important issue for Saskatchewan
members to raise at federal meetings. How close
an affiliation the Saskatchewan NDP wants with
the federal party is an appropriate issue for
members to debate at Provincial Council and
Convention.
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(8) We need to connect
more with Indigenous
Peoples and communities.
To meet this challenge, we must develop
deeper and long-term relationships with more
Indigenous leaders, elders and communities
to emphasize the relevance of provincial
politics and to ask them to consider the NDP
as a partner in getting their priorities
addressed by the province as appropriate. We
must focus on what is important to many
Indigenous voters: a sincere relationship
developed over time, and one that does not have
us showing up only near elections.
Any support from Indigenous voters needs to be
earned support that convinces people that voting
for the Saskatchewan NDP is meaningful and a
legitimate strategic choice even for those
Indigenous voters who believe, with good
reason, that their primary nation-to-nation legal
relationship is with the federal government.
Overarching all of this, the NDP must listen to
and learn from those willing to take the plunge
to try to build trust — and develop serious,
tangible plans for a fair partnership for when the
NDP returns to government.
We Recommend:
(8.1) An immediate priority must be the hiring
of an Indigenous organizer to ensure ongoing
outreach and organization efforts in conjunction
with the work of the Leader, MLAs, the
Indigenous wing and local constituency
associations.
(8.2) There should be an effort to address those
provincial services that would facilitate work
with Indigenous communities on and off reserve
including economic development, health care,
infrastructure links, social services, and
education and skills training. Given the many
ways in which provincial governments have
impacts on Indigenous communities, it is also
important to show where the federal government
has abandoned many of its responsibilities to
provinces.

(8.3) The panel further suggests that the
Saskatchewan NDP must not only walk the talk
of partnership with Indigenous Peoples,
communities, and leaders with respect to
provincial services and laws but should give
considerable thought to how the NDP — and an
NDP government — can be Indigenous
Peoples’ ally in fighting Ottawa for its
continuing failures and for its buck-passing to
the provincial governments.
(8.4) Deeper and more meaningful relationship
building between the Saskatchewan NDP and
Indigenous communities and individuals must
take very seriously the role of elders and
knowledge-keepers. Leader to leader trustbuilding between the NDP leader and
community leaders is crucial and must be
emphasized in the Leader’s ongoing priorities.
(8.5) Ongoing and strengthened efforts to ensure
our members and activists are properly
prepared to support Indigenous people,
including candidates for public offices, within
the party and in our communities in the face of
racism, bias, and other injustices.
(8.6) As the Saskatchewan NDP addresses its
relationships with Indigenous communities and
as it makes itself more attractive to youth,
special consideration should be given to
facilitating and welcoming Indigenous youth
to be core to the NDP as it evolves. The Panel
was highly impressed by the thoughtfulness and
leadership qualities of Indigenous youth, both
First Nation and Metis, and from whom we
heard a good number of insights. Indigenous
youth are at the very heart of Saskatchewan’s
future -- as bridge-builders, translators,
advocates and activists and as people ‘simply’
making their way in life in ways that help us
learn little by little how to embrace difference
and common humanity in the same breath. In
this respect, the action taken by Tristen
Durocher on the lawn of the Saskatchewan
legislature and beyond is an uncommonly
inspiring example of the power of Indigenous
youth to help lead Saskatchewan forward in the
decades to come.
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(9) We need to
strengthen relationships
with culturally diverse
communities.
We Recommend:
(9.1) A significant commitment to ongoing
outreach activities by the Leader, MLAs and
appropriate party bodies to build up
relationships, gain greater knowledge of the
specific experiences and concerns of newer
citizens and Saskatchewan’s culturally diverse
communities, increase our profile and organize
targeted constituency campaigns that will help
elect candidates, including from those
communities. We had a significant number of
candidates in the 2020 team who were from
culturally diverse communities and while none
were elected, some came very close, and that
growth and participation is a foundation for
more progress.
(9.2) More communications and organizing
actions that are geared to students and youth
within those communities in order to ensure
participation in the broadest possible ways.

(9.3) Clear recognition that, alongside
immigration and a growing presence of cultural
communities in Saskatchewan’s social fabric,
several developments – including growing
urbanization of Indigenous people and more
political activism from Indigenous communities,
amongst youth, and within many marginalized
communities -- are changing Saskatchewan
politics, and for the better, and that those
changes sometimes spark some resistance and
reactions.
(9.4) As a party we have done many good things
in this changing context. Now we need to do
more to remove remaining attitudinal
barriers, resistance to more inclusion, and
even examples of racism from within our
audiences of potential NDP voters (these were
brought up in meetings and included incidents
during election canvassing.)
(9.5) Ensure that all our members and activists
are properly recognizing, respecting, and
welcoming new people of all backgrounds at all
levels of the party. Local constituency leaders
and provincial bodies’ leadership teams need to
ensure genuine inclusion and involvement in all
aspects of the work of the party, from the work
of putting up campaign signs to nomination as
candidates to constituencies’ leadership.
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(10) We need to improve
how we debate and
generate policy and
platforms.
As we commented above, the party’s current
policy-making process tends to discourage
members and new recruits. The process that
produces policy resolutions at convention is an
awkward way to research, carefully consider,
balance and frame policy proposals that will
attract wide support in an election. Our policy
resolution process is hard to participate in, often
hard to listen to, and the results are not always
helpful. In our findings, we also particularly
noted members’ efforts to contribute to the
election platform directly, which produced
considerable frustration all around. Drawing on
this experience, it is crucial that the governance
bodies of the party and the membership develop
a productive understanding going forward.
The challenge in connecting participatory
internal democracy to general policy formation
and more specific platform development must be
squarely faced. That challenge is to harness
such participation in such a way that not only
good policy emerges in advance of platform
development, but also that, at election time,
campaign communications connected to policy
and platform are clear, focused, and take root
with those open to voting NDP. Ultimately, we
must bear in mind that, if our communications
with the broad public contain too many
messages, none of them will get through – a
problem that appears to have affected the 2020
campaign.
We recommend:
(10.1) That the leader appoint four policy
task forces, each co-chaired by a caucus

member and a party activist. We suggest a task
force on (a) jobs; (b) public services; (c) rural
and northern development; and (d) the real
record of the current government.
(10.2) These task forces will consult widely,
including with the party’s executive, wings and
working committees; MLAs, former MLAs, and
former candidates; riding association executives
and members; our labour partners; business
people; Indigenous communities and leaders;
civil society; academics and issue experts; and
municipal leaders and citizens. Our goal is to
engage friends and supporters in open,
collaborative, friendly, fact-based and resultsoriented discussions about these issues – a
process that will inspire and engage people.
(10.3) Consider building into the work of the
task forces one or more collaborative-decision
and digital-democracy tools in order to benefit
from the collective insight of members, experts
and stakeholders.
(10.4) That task force reports be considered
by the Executive, Council and Convention as
priority policy discussions – and be reported
out in final form as building blocks to our next
election platform, and guides to our work in the
Legislature and in outreach to communities.
(10.5) Policy generated by task force
processes and platform elements should be
embedded in a communications strategy
organized around clear core messages for wide
audiences. However comprehensive the policy
documents end up being, very deliberate choices
must be made on what to emphasize in
messaging.
(10.6) After going through this exercise, the
Executive and Council should consider whether
it might provide a model for a fundamental
reform of the convention policy resolution
process.
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(11) The candidate
nomination process
must be improved.
We Recommend:
(11.1) That the Election Planning Committee in
early 2022 develop a strategy for nominations
to consider timing with the goal that candidate
nominations start 24 -18 months prior to the
scheduled date of the 2024 election, with
appropriate preparations and criteria in place
prior to any nominations.
(11.2) That criteria for nomination meeting
approvals be adopted and include membership,
fundraising and voter contact goals, and
candidate search efforts (including diversity and
equity goals), with those criteria taking account
of the various categories of constituencies such
as incumbent, ‘2020 near win’, rural, etc.
(11.3) That sufficient resources be allocated
for thorough vetting of prospective candidates
for nominations and be sufficient to meet a
robust turnaround time.
(11.4) That the steering committee of the
Election Planning Committee be responsible for
the appointment of the candidate vetting staff
and make known to all bodies within the party
the Terms of Reference for the vetting process,
as developed and approved by the Provincial
Executive.
(11.5) That a decision of the candidate vetting
process may be appealed to the Officers of the
party who shall make the final decision of
approval/non-approval.
(11.6) That a candidate search task force be
appointed by the Election Planning Committee
by January 2022 and work with the caucus, the
wings of the party, affiliated trade unions,
constituency associations and others who can
actively support effective candidate search.

(11.7) That Terms of Reference for the
candidate search task force be made known to
all bodies within the party when it is appointed.
(11.8) That the Provincial Executive and/or the
Election Planning Committee undertake
significant internal communications directed
to constituencies and their activists to ensure that
they are aware of all aspects of the candidate
nomination process.
(11.9) That by July 2022 the Provincial
Executive have in place appropriate rules and
regulations to govern the conduct of
nomination meetings, including but not limited
to such questions as voter eligibility, mail-in
ballots, multi-day voting, nomination campaign
spending limits, nomination meeting
management plans, identification requirements,
notice periods, etc. As well, these regulations
should cover by-elections, snap elections and
other situations that may require the waiving or
alteration of standard nomination procedures.
The Executive is to appoint a task force to
develop this package of nomination meeting
regulations.
(11.10) That very serious consideration be given
to a constitutional amendment or regulation to
specify that members must be in good
standing 60 or 45 days prior to the nominating
meeting to be eligible to vote. That period would
allow time for verification of the membership
voter lists, for candidates to meet the members,
and for preparation of a well-organized
nomination meeting.
(11.11) That preparations be made soon for
the coming redistribution of constituencies,
which will require collaboration between the
provincial office and the constituency
associations.
(11.12) That provision be made for adequate
resources, primarily staff and volunteer time,
early in the coming cycle in order to execute a
successful nomination strategy in all 61
constituency associations.
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(12) We must address
the decline in turnout,
particularly from within
our voter base.
In each of the last three elections, voter turnout
has been very low in Saskatchewan: 51.1%
(2011), 53.5% (2016), and 52.8% (2020). This
is a consistent and marked drop since the 60.8%
turnout in 2007 when the NDP lost
government. Given the extent of the voter
discontent demonstrated in polls published at the
time of the 2017 SP budget and associated
cutbacks in services, we believe that greater
citizen participation and mobilization is possible
than the 2020 voter turnout. (We also have to
assume that COVID will not again be a factor
keeping some of our supporters home in 2024.)
The recent victories in Georgia and other US
states like Arizona have vividly demonstrated
the possibilities of expanded mobilization.
Georgia leader Stacey Abrams would be the first
to say that it ultimately took a cast of thousands,
on doorsteps, on street corners, and online. Not
just to reach out and advance-register Georgia
non-voters and new voters, but also to win the
turn-out war contest on election day, both in the
presidential election and in the double Senatorial
race two months later. That mobilization of
thousands of volunteers is our challenge here as
well.

The successes in Georgia made it very clear that
success in raising voter turnout is not possible
with just 28-day efforts or with just a stellar
GOTV effort alone – we need this approach for
the next three and a half years and beyond. All
of the turnout issues connect back to ‘the
permanent campaign’ model.
We recommend:
(12.1) Meaningful resources and energy must
be devoted to analysis of low voter turnout, to
development of ongoing long-term strategies
to increase overall voter turnout and to the
significant strengthening of our approach to GetOut-The-Vote (GOTV) operations during the
2024 election.
(12.2) We urge strong outreach,
communications, voter contact and advocacy
actions to connect more people in more of their
communities to our positions, values and
activities. These initiatives - directed towards
youth, Two-Spirited and LBGTQ communities,
new Canadians, farmers, workers and small
businesses in various sectors, Indigenous
communities and persons, suburban
neighbourhoods, and others - should all
approach voter turnout as not just one outcome
of more political engagement, but a critical one.
(12.3) We urge an action-centred, relationshipbuilding approach across all outreach plans and
activities. (See a number of recommendations
that spell this general principle out in more
concrete terms in different contexts).
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(13) We must engage
more youth in our party.
We must make membership as meaningful as
possible for all members, and some youth will
join for that reason. But, more generally, it may
not be productive to stick just to a membership
model of engagement that is producing limited
gains.
Instead, develop a ‘no strings attached’ approach
that will open doors to participation
opportunities that can expand over time.
Walk the talk on the issues that we know many
youth open to the NDP are concerned about —
including climate change, decent jobs, a fair
future for them in a world of deepening
economic inequality, decolonization and
combating resurgent racism.
We recommend:
(13.1) We recommend above that The
Commonwealth, “Coffee Row”, and a weekly
party bulletin be relaunched using email,
Facebook, Snapchat, Instagram, and other
appropriate online platforms. We suggest youth
members -- in particular, members of the
Youth Wing executive and team -- be invited
to participate as core members of the team to
help make this happen.
(13.2) Develop more -- and more creative -ways to draw young people to the party and
our activities, including but not limited to
membership. Invite folks to meaningful days of
action and events that can attract newcomers for
the substance of what is being done and that do
not feel like a sales pitch for joining the NDP.

(13.3) At the same time, the party must increase
traditional methods of expanding youth
involvement: building up campus clubs,
recruiting a critical mass of youth members in
all communities and demographic sectors,
training in organizational and communications
roles, expanding the summer intern program,
and standing up on the issues that most interest
younger people.
(13.4) Switch it up, too, as there is nothing
wrong with making democracy a bit more
fun, whether a Trivia night at a pub or a music
night or a video-games tournament. As well,
leader and MLA events can allow youth to
engage in casual meet and greets and talk with
the party’s elected representatives about their
work, politics and issues of the day:
conversations not just ‘meetings’.
(13.5) Perhaps most crucially, if the party takes
up our suggestion to consider digital
democracy tools and platforms for collaborative
engagement as part of the task-force policy
process, put youth — they do not have to be
members, that is part of our point — at the
forefront of scouting, selecting, testing and, as
possible, trialing good prospects with members.
Here, it is worth noting that some of the best
digital democracy platforms pay considerable
attention, at the design level, to the element of
enjoyable engagement when making choices and
giving one’s input.
(13.6) Go further. Enlist the ideas, tech savvy
and energy of youth to drive the party into
creative space. For example, consider
challenging NDP youth to use their know-how
to suggest ways in which the Saskatchewan
NDP should think about becoming its own
online broadcaster, generating serious content in
a non-boring way.
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(14) Our governance and
campaign planning need
reform.
Our party’s core decision-making bodies
need reform.
We recommend:
Overall governance improvement:
(14.1) That the President work with members of
the Provincial Executive, the members of the
Provincial Council and senior staff to review
and clarify ‘who does what’ in order to
maximize efficient operations and clear
decision- making responsibilities. Particular
attention should be given to the best use of
Council meetings to maximize focus on political
content and constituency development, rather
than the operational and administrative issues
being addressed by Officers and Executive.
(14.2) That the President undertake new actions
to strengthen the flow of information from
Executive and Council meetings going to
constituencies, affiliates and wings, including
reports, motions, and decisions as appropriate.
(14.3) Given that each constituency has two
Council representatives, we recommend that the
constitution be amended so that one of them is
the constituency president. That way, the
constituency ‘leader’ will be directly involved in
the deliberations of the Council and be able to
speak for her/his constituency positions. This
would make the Council a more efficient vehicle
to provide constituencies with the information
coming to the Council and decisions made by
the Council. We learned in our meetings that
currently too much Council information is not
reaching constituency executives and activists.

Traditionally in the Saskatchewan NDP,
elections are organized and overseen by a
“political committee” of cabinet ministers
working closely with the Provincial Executive.
This often worked well (the party won twelve
elections between 1944 and 2003), ensuring that
our leader and caucus kept the election cycle in
mind while doing their work in the Legislature
and working in close partnership with the party.
More recently we have imported an “election
planning committee” model from other NDP
sections. We have not won any elections under
this model.
We think we should go back to what has worked
here, suitably updated to fit current political
circumstances.
We recommend:
(14.4) That the (elected, widely representative
and accountable) Provincial Executive, plus the
steering committee outlined below be the
Election Planning Committee (EPC).
(14.5) That the leader appoint a steering
committee and name a chair. We suggest the
steering committee be composed of three
MLAs, two other seasoned party activists (nonstaff) appointed on the basis of their campaign
skills and experience, the party president, and
the Leader as an ex-officio member.

Election planning improvement:

(14.6) That the Provincial Executive, acting in
its EPC role, consider and approve the
campaign budget and the election platform
proposed by the steering committee. The
Executive’s key role should be to ensure that all
bodies represented on and by the Executive are
engaged in, and have their views carefully
considered, in the work of election planning and
preparations. The chair of the steering
committee should report on progress to the
Executive at least monthly.

Our party needs to become capable of
conducting four-year, 365-days-a-year
campaigns, which means the way we plan and
organize for elections needs to change.

(14.7) That the chair of the steering committee
meet at least weekly with the Leader, and be
charged to ensure perfect alignment on all
matters between its work and the party leader.
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The chair of the committee should also report
at least monthly to caucus, to consult on
strategic questions, and to ensure alignment
between the caucus’ work and campaign plans.
(14.8) That the Leader and President report to
the Provincial Council and Convention on
election plans.
(14.9) That the steering committee should meet
daily in the immediate run-up to a campaign and
during a campaign.
(14.10) The steering committee, subject to the
approval and oversight of the executive
should:
a. commission and consider all polling and
research;
b. direct the drafting of the platform, ensuring
the reports of policy task forces (see
Recommendation 5) are consider in the
drafting process and ensuring appropriate
internal and external consultations during
the process
c. design, propose, and oversee the campaign
budget;
d. hire and direct the work of a full-time paid
campaign director;

e. consider regularly updated proposals and
plans from the campaign director (and the
party CEO as appropriate) on a campaign
organization chart and budget; pre-campaign
and campaign leader’s tour; a candidate
recruitment, vetting and nomination plan;
local organizing and campaign plans; a
debate strategy; a close-of-the-campaign
strategy; a paid and earned communications
plan; and other appropriate work – and then
hold the campaign director accountable for
progress and results; and
f.

define the terms and conduct of an
appropriate competitive process to retain
campaign contractors; select a digital/paid
media advertising provider and a polling
firm for a fixed term not to exceed an
election cycle; and consider renewals or
change based on election results and
outcomes.

(14.11) We recommend everyone involved in
this work take the following to heart: it is the
duty of senior campaign and political staff to
“speak truth to power” by fearlessly and
candidly providing the steering committee and
the full EPC with their best advice. Then it is
their duty to diligently carry out and fully report
progress on direction given by the committee.
Non-elected staff are in advisory and staff roles.
The steering committee must not delegate or
abdicate its own role and responsibilities,
which are essential to success.
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(15) We need to expand
and improve our
fundraising.
We Recommend:
(15.1) A simpler revenue-sharing formula is
needed, one that has incentives to reward
individual constituencies’ efforts with fewer of
the complexities that bring frustration and likely
reduce revenues for all levels. We suggest rapid
assessment of the options by a special task force
of experienced staff and activists, including a
review of the formulae and recent experiences in
other major sections of the party, and
recommendations for changes.
(15.2) Digital fundraising potential must be
further assessed for increased growth beyond
our existing members and donors, including
examining all the methods and techniques used

in other sections and by civic organizations that
have successfully expanded this revenue stream,
to ensure ongoing success with best practices
and systems.
(15.3) More support for, and coordination
with, constituency fundraising is needed,
including direct mail, events, and ‘direct ask’
activities. The panel believes that investments in
central support for better and more regular local
constituency efforts will be rewarded in both
increased revenue and good will.
(15.4) In planning and executing enhanced fundraising approaches, great care must be taken not
to deepen the feelings of members that they
receive too many requests to donate in
comparison to other forms of communications.
In that respect, enhanced fundraising must be
pursued in parallel with improved and
expanded political engagement with
members.
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(16) Should we change
our brand?
The panel frequently heard the suggestion that a
name change could give the party a new start
and new appeal. The parallel was made with the
changes undertaken after the debacle of the
Devine period.
While we recognize that the SP was successful
with a new name and brand, we must remember
that those changes were necessitated by the
Grant Devine Conservative government’s string
of criminal convictions, widespread corruption
and total failure in its performance - they had no
alternative but to change their name. We are not
in that situation so the parallel does not apply at
all.

We Recommend:
(16.1) That we strengthen our brand by
“doing”, not saying. Explain our successful
record of governing Saskatchewan. Reconnect
with communities and citizens through strong
Opposition performance and active political
work year-round. Talk to more people more
often about their priorities (not just ours). Show
confidence and pride in what we have
accomplished and what we will accomplish that is the most powerful way to strengthen our
brand.
(16.2) That we remind people that we are the
Saskatchewan NDP, with deeper roots in this
province than the SP conservatives.
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(17) Party wings and
committees need
support, clear mandates,
and more involvement.
The party has a number of constitutionally
recognized entities that are often collectively
called “wings”. [this sentence to be deleted] In
our meetings it was clear that there is a wide
range of perceptions, levels of activity and some
confusion within the wings and committees.
Clarity is required.
We Recommend:
(17.1) That the CEO and the President
conduct a review of each wing and committee
in conjunction with the leaders and other
activists as appropriate to assess the situation of
each. This review should provide
recommendations to the Executive to guide
revision of wing and committee mandates if
necessary, review appropriate support and
resources, and assess their roles in the party’s
overall political strategies.

(17.2) The review should also examine the
relationships between the wings and
committees and the Executive, Council, and
caucus to determine if there are greater
opportunities for the wings and committees to
support the work of the party overall through
those bodies. Determine if they feel they are
being heard, if they know what the opportunities
are for them, if they have ideas to support broad
party and caucus strategies, and how they
understand where they fit, or could fit, in the
party processes.
(17.3) In this review and subsequent actions
concerning the wings and committees, the panel
urges recognition of the important role played
by some of the wings and committees in
bringing new people into active party
involvement, in recruiting and supporting
candidates for public office, and in providing
concrete support to their members and their
sectors of the Saskatchewan population. While
this has historically been the case for the SNDW
and the Young New Democrats, we feel there is
the potential for more growth in these directions
with the Agriculture and Rural Life, Rainbow
Pride, Indigenous and Diversity bodies, given
proper planning and support.

Page | 58

Part 4: Next Steps

Page | 59

Implementation:

appointed within 90 days to get to work on
modernizing nomination rules and procedures.

To generate some early momentum, we suggest
the following be undertaken within 90 days.
That is not to say that these are the top priorities,
rather we see these as some that can be started
up quickly even as the Leader, the CEO, the
President and the appropriate party bodies work
on the report as a whole. Many of our
recommendations are much broader strategic
steps and will be ongoing for years.

(4) We recommend rural zones be created
within 90 days as proposed in recommendation
6.2, as a first step to getting to work renewing
and rebuilding our party in rural Saskatchewan.

We recommend:
(1) We recommend the policy task forces
proposed in recommendation 10.1 be appointed
within 90 days, to get to work on policy renewal.
(2) We recommend the EPC steering
committee proposed in recommendation 14.5
be appointed within 90 days to get to work on
planning the next election.
(3) We recommend that the nominations rules
task force proposed in recommendation 11.9 be

(5) We recommend the Indigenous Organizer
proposed in recommendation 8.1 be appointed
immediately.
(6) We recommend the Leader, the CEO and the
President collaborate to provide a written
report tracking progress on the
implementation of the approved
recommendations at each meeting of the
Provincial Executive and the Provincial Council
until the next election.
Like those who met with us, we are eager
to see the changes and forward progress
that will lead to victory in 2024 and
beyond. We will be available to discuss
the report, our rationale for the contents
and any background information.

Page | 60

Appendix A:
Our panel
Judy Bradley grew up on a family farm south
of Regina, raised her family at Milestone and
now resides at Echo Lake. She is a retired
educator. Judy was elected as a Member of the
Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan under
Premier Romanow, representing Bengough Milestone from 1991 to 1995, and reelected for
1995-1999 in the redistributed constituency of
Weyburn-Big Muddy. During this time, she was
Caucus Vice-Chairperson and served in cabinet,
as Minister of Highways and Transportation and
Minister Responsible for the Status of Women.
Presently Judy is elected to the Prairie Valley
School Board and serves as a Vice Chair. Judy is
a dedicated lifetime member of the NDP.
Modeste McKenzie is a 26-year-old DeneMetis man who was raised in northern
Saskatchewan and currently resides in Prince
Albert. He has served the Saskatchewan NDP in
many different capacities but most recently as
the Vice-President of the party. Currently, he
attends the University of Regina and is a
community activist that is passionate about
Indigenous youth suicide prevention.
Craig Scott, originally from small-town
(Windsor) Nova Scotia, is Professor of Law at
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University.
He served as Member of Parliament for TorontoDanforth from 2012 to 2015 during which time
he was Official Opposition Critic for
Democratic and Parliamentary Reform and a
proud member of the NDP’s (then-named)
LGBTQ MP Caucus. Currently, Craig serves on

the Panel of Senior Advisors to the Auditor
General of Canada. He is also on the board of
Ethelo Decisions, a British Columbia “B Corp”
– at the same time as supporting digitaldemocracy initiatives through the non-profit
eDemocracy Network.
Gerry Scott lives in Vancouver and has been
active in the NDP since 1972. He served twice
as Provincial Secretary of the BC NDP, once in
the mid-1980s and again from 2003 to 2006. He
has worked in the House of Commons, the BC
Legislature and the Government of BC in a
number of research, communications and
strategic planning roles. Gerry was the Climate
Change Program Director at the David Suzuki
Foundation from 1998 to 2003. He has
organized and managed many campaigns in
several provinces (but regrettably not in
Saskatchewan) and several of BC’s federal
campaigns. In recent years Gerry managed the
2015 and 2019 Alberta campaigns, and was the
director of multicultural communications and
outreach in the 2017 and 2020 BC campaigns.
Brian Topp served as chief of staff to Alberta
premier Rachel Notley, deputy chief of staff and
director of research to Saskatchewan Premier
Roy Romanow, and as national campaign
director to federal NDP leader Jack Layton. He
is a member of the board of the Broadbent
Institute, a fellow at the Public Policy Forum,
and teaches a unit at McGill University’s Max
Bell School of Public Policy. He is a partner at a
public affairs consultancy in Toronto.
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Appendix B:
NDP vote by constituency 1978-2020
2020

2016

2011

2007

2003

1999

1995

1991

1986

1982

1978

N

Athabasca

56.8%

64.7%

63.8%

59.4%

70.7%

84.4%

40.2%

83.8%

55.2%

39.2%

58.2%

N

Cumberland

66.5%

62.3%

63.2%

66.0%

69.0%

69.0%

74.4%

80.7%

60.7%

64.4%

59.2%

34.1%

34.6%

35.9%

45.5%

57.9%

50.7%

67.0%

50.4%

37.6%

49.5%

58.5%

45.3%

59.1%

55.8%

44.0%

54.1%

49.5%

41.9%

46.3%

60.3%

52.3%

60.8%

70.9%

55.5%

70.4%

47.6%

42.2%

45.3%

58.7%

37.9%

37.9%

64.0%

38.5%

61.0%

58.7%

38.4%

54.9%

55.8%

39.2%

60.8%

37.8%

31.0%

38.3%

50.2%

42.6%

60.7%

49.7%

42.9%

55.6%

38.9%

32.8%

46.7%

60.5%

34.2%

Urb

Moose Jaw North

Urb

Moose Jaw Palliser

Urb

Moose Jaw South

Urb

Moose Jaw Wakamow

Urb

Prince Albert

Urb

Prince Albert Carlton

Urb

Prince Albert-Duck Lake

Urb

Prince Albert Northcote

Urb

Regina Albert North

Urb

Regina Churchill Downs

Urb

Regina Centre

Urb

Regina Coronation Park

Urb

Regina Dewdney

Urb

58.4%
41.1%

42.6%

45.9%

52.3%

62.6%

37.6%

48.6%

58.6%

54.0%

54.1%

59.7%

45.3%

49.1%

46.8%

53.3%

58.9%

48.6%

58.8%

68.0%
61.0%
69.9%

63.2%

62.9%

52.2%

63.5%

47.1%

69.3%

69.4%

51.1%

67.1%

72.0%

35.0%

45.5%

55.1%

Regina Douglas Park

60.1%

49.8%

41.3%

51.9%

57.0%

Urb

Regina Elphinstone-Ctr

59.9%

59.2%

57.1%

62.5%

66.4%

Urb

Regina Elphinstone

Urb

Regina Hillsdale

Urb

Regina Lake Centre

Urb

Regina Lakeview

Urb

Regina North

Urb

Regina Northeast

Urb

Regina Northwest

Urb

Regina Rosemont
Regina Sherwood

Urb

Regina University

Urb

Regina Victoria

Urb

Regina Walsh Acres

51.3%
62.8%
65.5%
44.2%
57.9%

56.5%
40.6%
54.0%

50.0%

43.0%

37.7%

42.7%

Urb

Saskatoon Broadway

Urb

Saskatoon Buena Vista

Urb

Saskatoon Centre

58.5%

57.1%

Urb

Saskatoon Churchill-Wldd

46.2%

40.2%

Urb

Saskatoon Eastview

50.8%

41.0%

Urb

Saskatoon Eastview-Hltn

Urb

Saskatoon Fairview

Urb

Saskatoon Greystone

Urb

Saskatoon Idylwyld

Urb

Saskatoon Massey Place

56.9%

52.1%
44.0%

Regina South

48.4%
38.7%

47.7%
48.8%

62.1%

42.6%

41.2%

48.5%

39.3%

62.0%

62.9%

52.5%

54.9%
64.2%
65.2%

50.6%

63.3%

39.0%

48.1%

47.6%

58.5%

65.3%

51.2%
54.0%

57.4%

61.9%

39.6%

45.4%

44.6%

43.5%

55.7%
52.5%

53.9%

39.7%

46.2%

51.3%

55.3%

56.7%

64.8%

66.6%

37.9%

38.8%

49.2%

47.9%

43.1%

37.9%

53.9%

62.8%

60.8%

53.9%

55.7%

61.4%

41.7%

35.3%

40.9%

44.2%

51.3%

Saskatoon Meewasin

Urb

Saskatoon Nutana

65.1%

56.5%

49.6%

51.7%

Urb

Saskatoon Riversdale

47.9%

48.2%

51.5%
34.6%

Saskatoon Sutherland

49.3%

53.1%

Saskatoon Mount Royal

Saskatoon Sutherland-Uni.

61.3%

53.4%

Urb

Urb

56.9%

54.9%

Urb

Urb

67.2%

41.2%

45.5%

Urb

63.0%

38.2%

44.1%

Urb

53.9%

51.2%

43.0%

58.0%

63.2%

55.5%

53.9%

64.8%

55.8%

59.5%

45.8%

57.2%

56.1%

62.7%

57.9%

68.2%

70.9%

68.5%

47.0%

64.7%

40.6%

58.9%

44.4%

49.1%

47.2%

34.1%

43.3%

47.0%
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Urb

Saskatoon University

Urb

Saskatoon Westmount

53.0%

42.6%

Urb

Saskatoon Westview

41.0%

46.3%

Sub

Martensville-Warman

18.5%

17.1%

Sub

Regina Albert South

Sub

Regina Gardiner Park

35.6%

34.4%

Sub

Regina Pasqua

44.7%

40.9%

Sub

Regina Qu'Appelle Valley

Sub

Regina Rochdale

38.9%

36.4%

Sub

Regina Wascana

Sub

Regina Wascana Plains

32.0%

Sub

Saskatoon Mayfair

Sub

Saskatoon Northwest

Sub

Saskatoon River Heights

Sub

Saskatoon Silverspring-Suth.

34.1%

40.6%

58.9%

49.2%

55.2%

27.1%

26.9%

31.3%

43.4%

40.2%

47.8%

35.5%

29.1%

25.4%

29.7%

37.4%

34.3%

45.8%

37.9%

28.5%

Saskatoon Siver Springs
Saskatoon South

Sub

Saskatoon Southeast

34.5%

28.0%

Sub

Saskatoon Stnbrdg-Dakota

28.1%

24.4%

Sub

Saskatoon Wildwood

Sub

Saskatoon Willogrove

31.8%

24.0%

21.6%

27.5%

39.0%

19.3%

28.4%

29.6%

38.3%

35.9%
15.2%

25.7%

30.8%

36.1%

13.3%

33.3%

31.5%

39.0%

7.2%

18.1%

16.1%

20.4%

22.1%

20.4%

24.5%

11.4%

8.6%

29.1%

36.8%

48.0%

38.7%

43.7%

13.5%

18.7%

28.9%

36.7%

48.4%

60.3%

46.7%

48.2%

37.2%

53.9%

25.7%

22.9%

North Battleford
Redberry
Redberry Lake
Rosetown-Elrose

32.4%
15.9%

18.1%

16.0%

20.0%

16.1%

19.5%

31.8%

35.5%

28.6%

31.9%

35.8%

43.8%

33.6%

42.2%

26.7%

28.5%

42.5%

Wilkie

NE

Arm River-Watrous

NE

Batoche

NE

Canora

NE
NE

32.0%

55.3%

45.2%

38.1%

47.6%

44.7%

38.5%

55.8%

47.6%

42.5%

43.8%

52.4%

28.7%

28.8%

23.9%

34.3%

51.3%

35.0%

31.5%

44.0%

44.3%

41.9%

36.3%

49.4%

39.0%

34.6%

29.4%

29.4%

32.5%

33.5%

20.3%

35.8%

58.8%

47.7%

36.4%

58.0%

34.0%

30.1%

26.8%

32.9%

49.9%

41.8%

42.8%

55.8%

36.5%

Rosthern
The Battlefords

43.8%

43.0%

27.1%

Rosetown-Biggar
Rosthern-Shellbrook

45.4%

40.9%

13.2%

Martensville
Meadow Lake

34.8%

49.0%

Cut Knife-Lloydminster

Lloydminster

41.3%
46.4%

18.7%

Biggar

Kindersley

62.9%

43.2%

Battleford-Cut Knife

Cut Knife-Turtleford

46.4%

42.9%

Sub

Biggar-Sask. Valley

41.2%

64.9%

46.4%

Sub

N
W
N
W
N
W
N
W
N
W
N
W
N
W
N
W
N
W
N
W
N
W
N
W
N
W
N
W
N
W
N
W
N
W
N
W

44.4%
65.3%

23.9%

28.7%

38.2%

27.8%

30.6%

30.3%

34.1%

36.3%

Canora-Pelly

24.0%

20.7%

27.0%

29.9%

37.8%

28.2%

39.8%

Carrot River Valley

19.8%

20.4%

22.2%

33.2%

42.0%

39.8%

43.2%
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NE

Humboldt-Watrous

NE

Humboldt

NE

Kelsey-Tisdale

NE

Kelvington-Wadena

NE

Kinistino

NE

Melfort

NE

Melfort-Tisdale

NE

15.0%

20.4%

35.0%
23.2%

28.0%

41.4%

39.9%

17.8%

18.5%

18.4%

23.1%

31.4%

15.8%

19.4%

24.7%

30.1%

38.3%

28.0%

41.7%

45.6%

44.8%

44.1%

51.6%

42.1%

33.6%

54.9%
50.3%

54.3%

44.0%

45.2%

51.7%

50.3%

47.2%

45.4%

54.6%

41.1%

37.6%

37.1%

49.0%

Nipawin

45.3%

38.6%

35.7%

43.1%

NE

Pelly

59.6%

47.0%

48.1%

56.4%

NE

Quill Lakes

49.8%

50.8%

47.6%

53.6%

NE

Saskatchewan Rivers

NE

Shellbrook

NE

Shellbrook-Spiritwood

NE

Shellbrook-Torch River

53.7%

46.6%

38.9%

NE

Turtleford

50.0%

43.7%

41.3%

51.5%

NE

Watrous

31.5%

27.7%

29.4%

31.2%

41.2%

47.7%

38.2%

42.6%

47.4%

38.7%

42.9%

52.0%

25.0%

38.1%

SW

Arm River

32.1%

35.2%

30.7%

41.8%

Assiniboia-Gravelbourg

35.9%

30.3%

33.7%

38.5%

SW

Bengough-Milestone

37.9%

35.1%

34.8%

42.6%

SW

Cypress Hills

SW

Lumsden-Morse

SW

Maple Creek

30.9%

31.7%

28.8%

32.5%

SW

Morse

34.8%

33.6%

33.8%

38.0%

SW

Shaunavon

37.3%

42.7%

38.6%

38.0%

SW

Swift Current

42.7%

51.0%

43.2%

33.4%

41.9%

32.6%

26.4%

28.5%

47.6%

36.3%

29.1%

31.8%

33.7%

SW

Thunder Creek
Wood River

17.3%

47.3%

SW

SW

15.7%

38.9%

9.5%

12.1%

18.0%

19.9%

12.4%

16.0%

23.4%

20.8%

38.6%

20.7%

30.2%

25.3%

19.8%

15.1%

16.5%
17.5%

23.2%

30.9%

20.0%

30.9%

14.0%

12.3%

14.7%

17.3%

26.0%

20.5%

30.4%

SE

Cannington

8.7%

8.8%

14.8%

16.6%

21.7%

14.6%

24.0%

SE

Estevan

7.0%

9.1%

17.3%

18.8%

31.4%

19.5%

35.6%

SE

Indian Head Milestone

28.2%

24.3%

20.0%

27.5%

39.4%

28.6%

43.5%

SE

Indian Head-Wolseley

SE

Last Mountain-Touchwood

25.2%

22.9%

28.9%

30.9%

39.8%

36.0%

46.2%

SE

Melville-Saltcoats

17.6%

21.9%

24.5%

31.8%

32.2%

SE

Melville

SE

Moosomin

16.3%

14.5%

19.0%

21.4%

30.9%

SE

Qu'Appelle

SE

Qu'Appelle-Lumsden

39.7%

26.1%

27.8%

33.2%

48.6%

46.6%

45.0%

49.8%

25.1%

38.1%

45.9%

38.5%

39.1%

48.3%

20.5%

32.1%

39.7%

31.7%

30.2%

33.0%

48.3%

39.9%

27.7%

43.8%

SE

Saltcoats

52.5%

46.6%

44.9%

46.0%

SE

Souris-Cannington

25.1%

38.2%

28.5%

22.3%

22.6%

29.1%

SE

Weyburn

45.3%

36.9%

34.4%

44.3%

SE

Weyburn-Big Muddy

13.2%

16.1%

22.1%

25.2%

40.6%

35.0%

41.6%

SE

Yorkton

23.3%

22.7%

27.7%

37.5%

51.5%

41.0%

49.6%

60.0%

44.7%

38.6%

46.9%
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